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THE BIRTH OF THE AUTHORNYM: AUTHORSHIP, 
PSEUDONYMITY, AND TRADEMARK LAW 
Laura A. Heymann* 
Consumers in the marketplace of ideas are well acquainted with one 
aspect of the Foucauldian concept of the "author function": the way in which 
an author's name serves to organize both producer inputs-the various 
works the author wishes to have associated with his name-and consumer 
inputs-the readers' interpretive reactions to any particular body of work. 
Indeed, choosing to write under a pseudonym or under one's true name is the 
way in which an author exerts control over this function by grouping certain 
works (for example, scholarly pieces) under one name and other works (for 
example, mystery novels) under a different authorial name, thus segregating 
readers' responses to each of these bodies of work. Readers, in tum, respond 
to this decision by mirroring the choices made by the author-continuing, for 
example, to refer to certain works as being authored by "Mark Twain" even 
when the author's true name of "Samuel Clemens" is known or accepting 
that the Nancy Drew series was written by "Carolyn Keene" rather than by a 
series of different writers over time. 
Borrowing from postmodem literary theorists Roland Barthes and 
Michel Foucault, and given that statements of authorship often tell readers 
very little, if anything, about the identity of the individual who put pen to 
paper, this Article proposes a separation of statements of authorship-what 
this Article terms "authornyms "-from facts of authorship. This construct 
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leads to the conclusion that all authornyms are essentially branding choices, 
even if the brand that is chosen is the author's true name, and therefore that 
the "author function " is really a "trademark junction. " If this is the case, 
then-as in trademark law-we should seek to preserve the organizational 
system of the "authornym function" and to minimize the likelihood of reader 
confusion that occurs when a work is used unlawfully without attribution-
in other words, when an author's choice of authornym is not preserved. 
The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission, which granted First Amendment protection to pseudonymous 
speech, was an inherent acknowledgment of the trademark value that 
authornyms serve and the importance of controlling the author function by 
the choice of authornym. But in its decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. eight years later, the Supreme Court largely de-
nied authors the ability to compel attribution of their works (and thereby 
preserve their authornymic choice) through the Lanham Act and thus denied 
readers the accurate attribution required for organized and efficient literary 
consumption. This Article contends that only by recognizing the essential 
pseudonymity of all statements of authorship-in other words, by decoupling 
the copyrightfocused concept of authorship from the trademark-focused state-
ment of authorship ( "authornyms ")-can we create room for the values that 
trademark law can promote in the marketplace of ideas. 
INTRODUCTION 
The traditional explanation of why the law extends protection to 
trademarks is an economic, market·based one. Trademarks, the ac-
cepted story goes, are a shorthand designed to reduce consumers' 
search costs by ensuring that the goodwill attributable to a mark is not 
misplaced.1 A consumer who enjoys the taste of Pepsi and who would 
like to buy more of the cola need not engage in a time-consuming 
tasting spree to find the drink that matches the qualities she exper-
ienced with her first purchase-she need only look for the Pepsi 
1 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) . 
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying 
mark, "reduce [s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing 
decisions," for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this 
item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as other simi-
larly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same 
time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competi-
tor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a de-
sirable product. 
/d. (quoting 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPE-
TITION§ 2.01 [2] (3d ed. 1996)); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 
90, 98 (1918) (describing a trademark as "merely a convenient means for facilitating 
the protection of one's good-will in trade"). 
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trademark. A competitor who interferes with this search process-
who increases consumers' search costs by misleading use of another's 
trademark-is deemed to have infringed by diverting sales intended 
for the trademark holder. 
"While some have examined noneconomic bases for extending le-
gal protection to trademarks,2 the vast majority of commentators and 
courts root this protection in the marketplace.3 It might seem odd, 
then, to consider trademark-like activity in a principally noneconomic 
context: the act of authorship. Authorship can, of course, be a com-
mercial activity, although-such as with scholarly writing-the ability 
to directly monetize one's work is not always the primary goal. Ac-
cordingly, the creative endeavor of authorship is typically thought of 
as a copyright-related activity, where the question is who holds the 
rights to exploit the text, to what degree, and for how long.4 Little 
attention has been paid, however, to a separate and distinct aspect of 
authorship: its trademark aspect. 
Each time an author creates, she must decide what name to give 
to the author of the text, what name to identify to the public as the 
"author" of the work. In many, or perhaps most, cases, the author 
chooses to use her real name as the name of the author. But this is 
not always the case: An author may write under one or several pseud-
onyms, whether to hide her identity completely or to experiment with 
a different writing style from that associated with her real name. Even 
though there may be a strong bias in favor of using one's real name as 
a statement of authorship, the author must, consciously or uncon-
sciously, make the choice each time she writes. 
"When the creation of the text is a corporate endeavor-either 
the work of more than one author or a work for hire-then the na-
ture of this choice becomes more apparent. Because there is no de-
fault statement of authorship in such cases, no "real name" from 
which a pseudonym would be a deviation, the choice of a statement of 
authorship is almost certainly a conscious choice, whether pre-
ordained by contract or custom or decided after completion of the 
work. 
2 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REv. 
621 (2004); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer 
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 799 n.84 (2004) (calling 
noneconomic justifications for trademark law "rare"). 
3 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE LJ. 1687, 1689-91 (1999) . 
4 I focus here on literary authorship (rather than authorship of films or music) 
because, as I hope to demonstrate, the branding exercise is more immediately appar-
ent for literary texts than for other forms of authorship. 
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In either case, this choice of an author's name for each created 
work is a branding choice. To begin with, an author may-like a mar-
keting team devising a brand for a new product-choose a statement 
of authorship that conveys certain qualities about the work to which it 
is attached. A writer of romance novels may choose a Victorian-sound-
ing pseudonym; a female author of a war novel may choose a more 
masculine-sounding pen name to avoid biased readers. More impor-
tant, however, is that the choice of an author's name, like a trade-
mark, represents an attempt to reduce readers' search costs by 
ensuring that the goodwill attributable to the writer does not flow to 
another author. Rather than publishing works anonymously, a writer 
who chooses a statement of authorship corrals goodwill associated 
with that name to avoid diversion to competing authors. So, like the 
cola drinker mentioned above, the reader who enjoyed the first john 
Grisham novel and would like to read another does not have to spend 
time poring over books in the bookstore to find the one whose quali-
ties match the first book she enjoyed. She can, rather, simply look to 
the author's name-the trademark-like 'John Grisham"-to find such 
books instead. 
'John Grisham" is, presumably, the writer's real name, but there 
is no legal imperative that requires the writer to make this choice. Mr. 
Grisham could have written his courtroom dramas under the name 
'John Smith," or "Mary Johnson"; he could have chosen 'John 
Grisham" for his novels and another name altogether for his (hypo-
thetical) foray into cookbooks. Because most readers know the name 
'John Grisham" only as an author and not otherwise, the fact that he 
has chosen 'John Grisham" as his statement of authorship as opposed 
to 'John Smith" is a distinction without a difference. Had he chosen 
'John Smith" his readers would undoubtedly evaluate his texts no dif-
ferently; they would simply associate them with a different statement 
of authorship from the one with which they currently do.5 The con-
ventions of authorship (and of readership) require the author to 
make some choice, but they don't require any particular choice. Be-
cause an author must make this kind of branding decision each time 
she creates, and because the word "pseudonym" to describe this deci-
sion is too restrictive (in that its conventional meaning does not usu-
5 As I will describe more fully infra, we, as readers/ consumers of cultural com-
modities, generally have no problem keeping two such appellations separate in our 
minds, even as we are fully aware of their genetic connection. For example, most 
readers of literature are aware of the fact that "Mark Twain" is a pseudonym for "Sa-
muel L. Clemens" and yet feel no compulsion to attribute the works of Twain to Clem-
ens and thereby eliminate the ability of "Mark Twain" to serve as a statement of 
authorship. 
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ally include the choice to write under one's real name), I offer here 
the word "authornym." An authornym, as I use the term, is the state-
ment of authorship offered to the consuming public-in other words, 
the author's trademark.6 
Thinking of an authornym as something akin to an author's 
trademark does not require a complete reinvention of trademark law. 
Quite the opposite: Just as trademark law is primarily concerned with 
consumer confusion but is otherwise agnostic as to the producer's 
choice of mark, trademark law should also be primarily concerned 
with reader confusion but should care little what authornym the 
writer chooses. Altria is free to use different brands for its cigarettes 
("Marlboro") and macaroni-and-cheese mix ("Kraft") even though 
neither mark directly identifies the producer; Samuel Clemens is free 
to write under "Mark Twain" without ever telling the reader his true 
identity. To use postmodern literary theory terminology, the author 
statement as signifier is distinct from the writer as signified. To make 
sure that we get the next john Grisham novel, we need pay attention 
primarily to the signifier; the signified is largely irrelevant to this 
search. 
The irrelevance comes from the anonymous source doctrine in 
trademark law, which tells us that so long as a particular trademark is 
linked to a single source of a good or service, the name of that source 
can remain unknown to the relevant consumer base.7 This is what 
frees producers from the requirement of the single mark from the 
guild era and permits them to affirmatively choose an identity to be 
associated with their product. As a result, the mark may well suggest 
some quality about the product (or suggest a quality the producer 
wishes to convey about the product, whether or not it is empirically 
true), but it need not directly convey any information about the iden-
tity of the producer itself. So, too, an authornym enables a producer 
(here, of literary works) to affirmatively choose an identity to be asso-
ciated with his work product that need not bear any resemblance to 
his "true'' identity. The authornym can be as descriptive ("Dear 
Abby") or as fanciful ("Saki") as he likes, and can be distinctive 
6 Others have used the tenn "signature." See, e.g., PEGGY KAMUF, SIGNATURE 
PIECES: ON THE INSTITUTION OF AUTHORSHIP 39 (1988); see also United Drug Co., 248 
U.S. at 98 (referring to a trademark as a "commercial signature"); FRANK I. 
SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAw RELATING TO TRADE-MARKs 
156 (1925) (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 516 
(7th Cir. 1913)). 
7 See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. 
L. REv. 827, 844 n .70 (2004) (citing Manhattan Shirt Co. v. Sarnoff-Irving Hat Stores, 
Inc., 164 A. 246, 250 (Del. Ch. 1933)) . 
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (VOL. 80:4 
("Mark Twain") or not ("Anonymous"). So long as the chosen 
authornym serves the primary goal of reducing consumers' /readers' 
search costs-and, more pointedly, does not increase those costs by 
misdirecting consumers through misattribution-the law should not 
much care which authornym is chosen or whether it bears any resem-
blance to the author's true name.8 
Although the authornym, like a trademark, carries a primarily ec-
onomic justification-the aforementioned reduction of search costs-
there is a noneconomic justification as well. Authors use particular 
authornyms not only to ensure that repeat customers can find subse-
quent works easily, but also to draw lines between canons, including 
some works and excluding others. The university professor who wants 
to write mystery novels on the side, for example, may write those 
novels under a pseudonym so that readers (and her tenure commit-
tee) do not think less of her scholarly work for the literary frolic. The 
well-known magazine writer who wants to write a political novel may 
refrain from doing so under his real name in the hope that readers 
will thereby approach the novel free from bias. The authornym is 
therefore a trademark not only in the marketplace of books, but also, 
as the literary theorists tell us, in the marketplace of ideas. 
In order to acknowledge the trademark work that authornyms 
do, however, we must first separate the fact of authorship (the au-
thor's identity) from the statement of authorship (the author's 
name) . The former is the province of copyright law; the latter is (or 
should be) the province of trademark law. As I will describe more 
fully later, the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twen-
tieth Century Fox Film Corp.9 is an example of courts' seeming reluc-
tance to recognize this distinction. In Dastar, Twentieth Century Fox 
argued that unfair competition law required Dastar to provide autho-
rial attribution for the work it was distributing but (according to 
Twentieth Century Fox) did not create. Twentieth Century Fox was 
not seeking (or, at least, should not have been seeking) to prevent 
8 Although this Article is concerned only with literary endeavors as opposed to 
other forms of "authorship" or creative activity, there are parallels elsewhere in the 
creative world. Actors' Equity Association, the American actors' union, requires ac-
tors whose professional name is identical to that of another Equity member, "or simi-
lar enough to cause confusion," to change his or her name or to add a full middle 
name. Actors' Equity Association, How Can !/Should I Change My Name?, at http:// 
web.actorsequity.org/faqpublic/ QADetails.asp?locator=76 (last visited Feb. 9 , 2005). 
In a similar vein, see Tara Bahrampour, A Boy Named Yo, Etc., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2003, at Bl (noting that New York regulations do not allow a resident to legally 
change his name to that of a public figure if doing so is likely to cause confusion). 
9 539 u.s. 23 (2003). 
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Dastar from copying or distributing the work at issue-because the 
work was in the public domain, Dastar was free to copy and distribute 
as much or as little of the work as it desired.10 Nevertheless, the Court 
rejected Twentieth Century Fox's attribution claims, characterizing 
them as an unwarranted expansion of copyright law.11 But if the work 
was indeed misattributed, the harm was not a copyright harm but a 
trademark harm: a harm to the consumers of the creative product 
through the disruption of the organizational system of attribution that 
authornyms establish. 
My contention in this Article is that once we recognize the essen-
tial pseudonymity of all statements of authorship-once we decouple 
the act of authorship inherent in copyright law from statements of 
authorship-it should not be difficult to recognize the congruence 
between authornyms and trademarks. From there, we can recognize 
the concept that the values that trademark law promotes-
"reduc [ing] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing 
decisions" and "help [ing] assure a producer that it (and not an imitat-
ing competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards as-
sociated with a desirable product"12-are equally valid goals when the 
"customer" shops in the marketplace of ideas.13 Authorship, in other 
words, has both copyright and trademark components, and the law 
should take account of both. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the birth and 
death of the concept of authorship. It describes how the notion of the 
author-genius was both preceded and followed by periods in which 
statements of authorship were understood to be suspect or expected 
to be nonexistent. It continues by positing, in light of this indetermi-
nacy of authorship and borrowing from literary theory, the ways in 
which all writing is essentially pseudonymous, even when the pseudo-
nym is textually equivalent to the writer's true name, and introduces 
the term "authornym" to comprise these various nominative choices. 
Part II provides an analysis of the authornym as trademark. It begins 
10 !d. at 33-34. 
11 !d. at 37. 
12 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted) . 
13 As I describe more fully infra, the concept of authornym as trademark seems to 
have gained currency among literary critics but has fared less well among legal aca-
demics. See, e.g., SIMON DuRING, FouCAULT AND LITERATURE: TowARDs A GENEALOGY 
OF WRITING 124 (1992) ("In modernity there has been a shift of author function: the 
authorial name has become a property . . .. "); MARK RosE, AuTHORS AND OWNERS: THE 
INVENTION OF CoPYRIGHT 1 (1993) ("[T]he name of the author . .. becomes a kind of 
brand name, a recognizable sign that the cultural commodity will be of a certain kind 
and quality.") . 
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by considering how the trademark is in fact a form of identity crea-
tion. It then builds on this concept by demonstrating how 
authornyms evince this kind of identity creation, both in the commer-
cial context and, drawing on literary theory, in the literary context. 
Part II concludes by considering the Supreme Court's primary case 
addressing the First Amendment right to speak anonymously and 
demonstrates how this case was not truly about anonymous speech but 
rather was a validation of the right to make authornymic choices even 
when the disjuncture between the chosen authornym and the writer's 
true identity renders the choice a technically false statement. Part III 
then considers how best to preserve the organizational function of 
authornyms and explores, in light of the Court's opinion in Dastar, 
the availability of a reverse passing off claim such as that typically 
brought pursuant to section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act. Part III con-
cludes by contending that the Court's decision in Dastar resulted from 
looking at the case through the wrong lens-through an author-cen-
tric lens rather than a reader-focused one-and, in so doing, neglect-
ing to consider the primary goal of trademark law: to eliminate the 
likelihood of consumer (here, reader) confusion. And finally, the Ar-
ticle concludes with some thoughts on how the limited function of the 
authornym might serve both authorial and reader I consumer goals. 
I. AuTHORSHIP AND PsEUDONYMI'IY 
A. The Birth and Death of the Author 
For some time now in the legal literature, the trope of the Ro-
mantic author has held considerable sway. Although it has been sub-
ject to critical question over the years, the vision of the solitary genius 
working alone in the garret, giving birth to literary masterpieces, 
seems to have retained its place at the core of copyright law and pol-
icy.14 To be sure, this vision has been considerably deconstructed in 
recent years to the point at which some give it virtually no weight in 
the formation of copyright law and policy. Nevertheless, when we talk 
about "the author" of a work, it is, I suspect, some sort of individual 
creator we have in mind: the person responsible for the words on the 
page and the person identified at the start of the work. 
14 See, e.g., James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Black-
mail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413, 1463-69 (1992) (describing the devel-
opment of the "romantic author" vision of authorship) ; James D.A. Boyle, The Search 
for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 625, 628-33 (1988) [here-
inafter Boyle, The Search for an Author] (describing the "romantic vision" of 
authorship). 
THE BIRTH OF THE AUTHORNYM 
But authorship has never been so simple or so solitary. The con-
cept of authorship-particularly the Romantic concept-is a relatively 
recent development in the history of publication. 15 In times or socie-
ties where storytelling was accomplished through oral, rather than 
written, tradition, the concept of the author as we now know it was 
virtually nonexistent. Stories resided entirely in the public domain 
and the storyteller was simply the medium through which they were 
conveyed to the audience. Hence, the storyteller's talent was mea-
sured not by his creativity, but by his lack of creativity-his ability to 
re-present known texts.16 Contrary to what U.S. copyright law ac-
knowledges today as "authorship," this tradition recognized mimicry, 
not originality. 
The move to written memorialization, rather than oral presenta-
tion, of narrative did not bring with it a determinate sense of author-
ship. The actual creator of a particular piece of writing was 
historically not the person identified as the author. Instead, a name 
was chosen that would lend the work prestige or facilitate distribution 
and acceptance.17 Many Biblical scholars believe that the Gospels, for 
example, were written not by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and john, but in-
15 See, e.g., jAMES BoYLE, SHAMANs, SoFTWARE, AND SPLEENs: LAw AND THE CoN-
STRUcnoN OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETI' 53-54 (1996); Peter jaszi & Martha Wood-
mansee, Introduction to THE CoNSTRUCTION OF AuTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION 
IN LAw AND LITERATURE 1, 2-3 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) [here-
inafter THE CoNSTRUCTION OF AuTHORSHIP]; Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Ef 
feet: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CoNSTRUCTION OF AuTHORSHIP, supra, at 15, 15. 
16 See, e.g., RoLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, Music, TEXT 142, 
142 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) ("[I]n ethnographic societies the responsibility for 
a narrative is never assumed by a person but by a mediator, shaman or relator whose 
'performance'-the mastery of the narrative code-may possibly be admired but 
never his 'genius."'); ALVIN KERNAN, THE DEATH OF LITERATURE 122 (1990); Donald 
E. Pease, Author, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY 105, 105 (Frank Lentricchia 
& Thomas McLaughlin eds., 2d. ed. 1995) (noting that "auctor," the predecessor 
term to "author," represented "adherence to the authority of cultural antecedent"); 
James R. Kincaid, Purloined Letters: Are We Too Quick to Denounce Plagiarism?, THE NEw 
YoRKER, Jan. 20, 1997, at 93, 98 ("The idea that words, ideas, texts were originated 
privately was not honored much in the classical world, and many have said that it was 
meaningless to the medieval, where writing was connected not to personality but to a 
total coherence provided by God."). 
17 See DAVID G. MEADE, PsEUDONYMITI' AND CANoN: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
RELATIONSHIP OF AUTHORSHIP AND AUTHORITI' IN JEW1SH AND EARLIEST CHRISTIAN TRA-
DITION 1-2 (1986); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the 
Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss., 
Spring 1992, at 139, 144 (quoting Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian 
Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REv. 261 , 271-73 (1989), who notes that 
such works are now often cited with the prefix "Pseudo" beside the na me of the origi-
nally attributed author). 
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stead by early, and now anonymous, Church teachers and were later 
ascribed to the saints to gain legitimacy.18 In the Shakespearean era, 
pseudonymous authorship was used as a means of suggesting the col-
laborative forces necessary to create a literary work.19 In the 1700s 
and early 1800s, readers did not often expect authorial attribution on 
the work itself, either because such attribution was deemed unimpor-
tant or unseemly or because the author was well known and so needed 
no explicit mention.20 And although the development of the printing 
press made wide distribution of publications logistically and economi-
cally feasible, it did not simultaneously engender the birth of the 
writer as author in the sense that U.S. copyright law assumes today. In 
early-eighteenth-century England, for example, it was typically the 
printer or stationer who was deemed the source of the publication 
and the entity legally responsible for its contents;21 not surprisingly, it 
18 MEADE, supra note 17, at 13, 207; C. Jan Swearingen, Originality, Authenticity, 
Imitation, and Plagiarism: Augustine's Chinese Cousins, in PERSPEGrlVES ON PLAGIARISM 
AND INTELLEGrUAL PROPERTI' IN A PosTMODERN WoRLD 19, 33 (Lise Buranen & Alice 
M. Roy eds., 1999). 
19 Marcy L. North, Rehearsing the Absent Name: Reading Shakespeare's Sonnets Through 
Anonymity, in THE FAcEs oF ANoNYMITI': ANoNYMous AND PsEUDONYMous PuBLICATION 
FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19, 23 (Robert]. Griffin ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter THE FACES OF ANoNYMITI']. 
In both print and manuscript, book producers and compilers [in Shake-
speare's time] utilized a wide variety of conventions to present "authors" to 
their readers. Among the most popular were extensive prefatory materials, 
initials instead of full names, subscripts after authorial clusters, anagrams, 
the practice of attributing a miscellany to one prominent author, and, most 
important, anonymity. These conventions often obscured the intellectual 
claim of specific authors and called attention to the collaborative production 
of the text. 
Id.; Peter Beal, Letter to the Editor, Shall I Die?, TIMES LITERARY SuPPLEMENT, Jan. 3, 
1986, at 13 (describing the association of names with creative works in the Shakes-
pearean era "for a variety of reasons besides simple authorship"). 
20 GERARD GENETTE, PARATEXTS: THRESHOLDS OF INTERPRETATION 43, 45 Qane E. 
Lewin trans., 1997); Roger Chartier, Figures of the Author, in OF AuTHORS AND ORIGINS: 
EssAYS ON CoPYRIGHT LAw 7, 17 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) [hereinaf-
ter OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINs]; cf. Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How 
We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1405, 1450 
(2004) (detailing similar development in attribution of musical compositions). Of 
course, other authornyms took the place of the author's legal name in this era; Jane 
Austen ("by the author of Sense and Sensibility") and Walter Scott ("by the author of 
Waverly"). are among the more well-known examples. Chartier, supra, at 17. 
21 See, e.g., Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Geneal-
ogy of Modern Authorship, in OF AuTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 20, at 23, 27; David 
Saunders, Dropping the Subject: An Argument for a Positive History of Authorship and the 
Law of Copyright, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 20, at 93, 96, 107-08. 
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was also these publishers who were the major driving forces behind a 
push toward statutory copyright.22 
Literary and legal historians seem to agree that the birth of the 
writer as author took place in the eighteenth century, when various 
historical threads-including the availability of mass distribution 
through the printing press and the decline of patronage-came to-
gether in a single cultural moment in which the author became both a 
creative and an economic progenitor. 23 With this Romantic vision of 
the individual author came a transformation of his literary output. 
Creativity was now valued over mimicry, and the author-no longer 
simply the medium through which others' tales were delivered-be-
came a part of the work. In this worldview, the work was seen as an 
expression of the author's personality, and so the more known of the 
22 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, 10 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. LJ. 293, 296 (1992). As Mark Rose has noted, the 
parties in the leading English copyright cases of the eighteenth century were booksell-
ers, not writers. Rose, supra note 21, at 32 (citing Donaldson v. Becket, 98 Eng. Rep. 
257 (K.B. 1774); Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769); Tonson v. Collins, 96 
Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B. 1760)). 
23 See, e.g., Chartier, supra note 20, at 17 ("The new place in writing in society 
supposed the full visibility of the author, the original creator of a work from which he 
could legitimately expect a profit."); Robert J. Griffin, Anonymity and Authorship, 30 
NEw LITERARY HIST. 877, 877 (1999); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metammphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DuKE LJ. 455; David Saunders & Ian Hunter, Les-
sons from the "Literatory": How to Historicise Authorship, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 479, 480 
(1991); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Condi-
tions of the Emergence of the "Author, "17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 ( 1984) . But see 
Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary 
France, 1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109, 113-14 (1990) (contending that in late-
eighteenth-century France, the creation of the author was a political, rather than eco-
nomic, act, as it allowed the state to hold the author directly accountable); Peter Lin-
denbaum, Milton's Contract, in THE CoNSTRucnoN OF AuTHORSHIP, supra note 15, at 
175, 175 (commenting that the eighteenth-century recognition of the author had its 
genesis in the introduction of print in Western culture); Marjut Salokannel, Film Au-
thorship in the Changing Audiovisual Environment, in OF AuTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra 
note 20, at 57, 57 (situating the idea of the modem artist as creative genius in the 
Italian Renaissance). In What Is an Author? Michel Foucault posited a reversal in at-
tributional trends in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, in which scientific texts 
required no authorial attribution to gain credibility, while more literary writing re-
quired attribution, the reverse (claims Foucault) of the attributional trend previous to 
that time. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES 
IN PosT-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141, 149-50 Qosue V. Harari ed., 1979). But see 
Chartier, supra note 20, at 21 (calling Foucault's hypothesis "fragile" and contending 
that the distinction is not between scientific and literary texts but between ancient 
texts (which typically depended on attribution for their authority) and the body of 
works in the vernacular, from which only a few "authors" (Dante, for example) ini-
tially emerged but which gained additional authors with time). 
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (VOL. 80:4 
author's biography and intentions, the better the literary interpreta-
tion. 24 This Romantic vision of authorship was at some remove from 
the mechanistic "literatory" represented by the Grub Street press. 25 
Here, the author was not simply the scrivener who put pen to paper 
(or, in later times, set type in rows) but rather the wellspring of intel-
lectual activity from whence the words on the page sprung. The Ro-
mantic author thus embodied both aspects of the writing process-
the conception of ideas and the evolution of those ideas into written 
text-even if, as today, the economic realities of the publication pro-
cess (realities that permitted even the Romantic author to thrive) 
were far removed from this idealism. 26 
The burgeoning of postmodern literary theory and its cousin 
deconstructionism in the middle of the twentieth century began to 
call this image of the author into question. 27 Critics such as Roland 
Barthes and Michel Foucault took issue with the focus on the author 
as the source of all interpretive meaning in a text and proposed in-
stead a more reader-focused method of literary interpretation. In the 
postmodernists' view, the primacy given to the author's interpretation 
(via biography or otherwise) was misplaced: Each reader brings his or 
her own meaning to a text, and each of those meanings is as equally 
valid as the author's, if not more so.28 As Terry Eagleton has noted, 
"[£]or literature to happen, the reader is quite as vital as the author."29 
It is therefore not only the writer who has a claim to authorship of a 
text, but all those who have come before (for whom the writer func-
tioned as reader) and all those who come after. 
24 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 21, at 51. 
25 The oral argument in Dastar, which suggests a consensus that Dastar's "argua-
bly minor" alterations to the public domain work at issue in that case could be suffi-
cient to constitute a work sufficiently "original" to be subject to its own copyright 
protection, see Transcript of Oral Argument, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428), available at 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 35; 
see also Dastar Corp v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003), may 
suggest that we are closer to the literatory than to the Romantic ideal. See also Jaszi, 
supra note 22, at 300-02. 
26 PAuLK SAINT-AMouR, THE CoPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTI' AND THE LIT-
ERARY IMAGINATION 31 (2003). 
27 TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARYTHEORV: AN INTRODUCTION 74 (1983) ("Indeed one 
might very roughly periodize the history of modern literary theory in three stages: a 
preoccupation with the author (Romanticism and the nineteenth century); an exclu-
sive concern with the text (New Criticism); and a marked shift of attention to the 
reader over recent years."). 
28 See, e.g., BARTHES, supra note 16, at 142; Foucault, supra note 23, at 145; An-
nabel Patterson, Intention, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY, supra note 16, at 
135, 135-36; Pease, supra note 16, at 112-16. 
29 EAGLETON, supra note 27, at 74. 
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The postmodernists thus returned the concept of authorship to 
its pre-Romantic origins, in which all writers are readers, all readers 
are writers, and the "author" is simply the medium by which collective 
creation is presented. In such a world, where originality is a contested 
concept and where attribution was not prevalent or was known to be 
suspect, the savvy reader would have given little weight to the pur-
ported authorial biography or intention.30 Indeed, given the collabo-
rative nature of many writing endeavors, reliance on authorial intent 
is likely to be even more futile, as it is unclear which "author" we 
should be endeavoring to discover: for example, the claimed (often 
celebrity) author whose name is on the title page or the ghostwriter 
who was responsible for putting pen to paper.31 
What is now perhaps the primary description of this deconstruc-
tion of authorship is Barthes's "death of the author."32 As Barthes 
described it, any text "is made of multiple writings, drawn from many 
cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, con-
testation," all centering on the reader, who is "simply that someone who 
holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text 
is constituted."33 In Barthes's view, discovering the identity of the au-
thor-and with it his intentions or motivations-does nothing to 
30 See jeffrey A. Masten, Beaumont and/or Fletcher: Collaboration and the Interpretation 
of Renaissance Drama, in THE CoNSTRUGriON OF AuTHORSHIP, supra note 15, at 361, 
362-63 (describing collaborative, "pre-anonymous" works as those works "without 
ascription of authorship" written at a time "before the word ('anonymous'] itself 
emerged with the author to describe their condition"); Virginia Woolf, "Anon" and 
"The Reader": Virginia Woolfs Last Essays (Brenda S. Silvered.), 25 TWENTIETH CENTURY 
LITERATURE 356, 397 (1997) ("Anonymity was a great possession. It gave the early 
writing an impersonality, a generality. It gave us the ballads; it gave us the songs. It 
allowed us to know nothing of the writer: and so concentrate upon his song."). 
It might be said that E.M. Forster anticipated the postmodernists by over a gener-
ation. In his essay Anonymity: An Inquiry, Forster decried the modern tendency to 
focus on the relation between an author's biography and his work: 
What's so wonderful about great literature is that it transforms the man who 
reads it toward the condition of the man who wrote, and brings to birth in us 
also the creative impulse . . .. Literature tries to be unsigned .... We are 
conscious only of the world [such authors] have created, and we are in a 
sense copartners in it. 
E.M. Forster, Anonymity: An Inquiry, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Nov. 1925, at 588, 592-93. 
31 See Masten, supra note 30, at 372 ("A collaborative perspective also forces are-
evaluation of (and/or complicates) a repertoire of familiar interpretive methodolo-
gies-most prominently, biographical and psychoanalytic approaches-based on the 
notion of the singular author."). 
32 BARTHES, supra note 16. 
33 !d. at 148. 
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guide the reader to the "true" interpretation of a piece.34 Rather, the 
meaning of a text is found in the reader (himself something of a con-
struct), who brings his own experiences and values to the interpretive 
effort. 35 The end result is that a piece of writing has no single mean-
ing but rather can support different and perhaps even conflicting in-
terpretations. 36 The death-of-the-author theory thus lies in tension 
with a Romantic view of authorship. If "[t]he author is to his text as 
God, the auctor vitae, is to his world," then the death of the author 
34 /d. at 143 ("The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman 
who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent 
allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author 'confiding' in us."). 
35 See Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of 
the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 725, 736 n.54 (1993) ("Textual identity turns on what 
the reader brings to the reading process, and because readers differ in their cultural, 
linguistic, and rhetorical background, texts will differ upon successive readings."). 
36 SEAN BuRKE, THE DEATH AND RETuRN oF THE AuTHOR: CRITICISM AND SusJECTIV-
I'IY IN BARTHES, FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA 43 (1992). I should note that Burke rejects 
the death of the author as "a particularly acute form of critical blindness." /d. at 154. 
While Barthes generally decried the search for the author's true identity, that search 
is, of course, one of the primary goals of readers and critics of pseudonymous works, 
typically in a mistaken belief that the discovery of this identity will lead the reader 
further along the path to "true" meaning. See BARTHES, supra note 16, at 147. 
To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a 
final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very 
well, the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the Au-
thor . . . beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is 
'explained'-victory to the critic. 
/d.; DoN FoSTER, AUTHOR UNKNOWN: ON THE TRAIL OF ANONYMOUS (2000) (describ-
ing his research in discovering the authors of pseudonymous or anonymous works); 
Foucault, supra note 23, at 149-50 ("[l]f a text should be discovered in an state of 
anonymity-whether as a consequence of an accident or the author's explicit wish-
the game becomes one of rediscovering the author."); Masten, supra note 30, at 361 
("'It were . .. wisdome it selfe, to read all Authors, as Anonymo's, looking on the 
Sence, not Names of Books ... .'" (quoting RicHARD WHITLOCK, ZooTOMIA, OR, OBSER-
VATIONS ON THE PRESENT MANNERS OF THE ENGLISH: BRIEFLY ANATOMIZING THE LIVING 
BY THE DEAD 208 (London, Tho. Roycroft & Humphrey Moseley 1654))). Even in 
those instances, however, the search for meaning relies on the text. See FosTER, supra, 
at 7. 
!d. 
When asked, Who wrote this document?, I usually begin the inquiry by asking of 
text databases, Where else can I find similar language and writing habits? That 
question may not lead me to the author, but it's usually good for informa-
tion about the author's age, religion, education, job, motivation, or 
ideology. 
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represents a "departure of belief in authority, presence, intention, 
omniscience and creativity. "37 
Barthes was not, of course, the last postmodern word on author-
ship. Indeed, Michel Foucault's 'What Is an Author?38 provided a 
much-needed anchor for Barthes's rather unmoored author by restor-
ing a limited, but important, organizational role for statements of au-
thorship (what he termed a "classificatory function"39). But in 
whatever incarnation, it is fair to say that the fundamental difference 
between the postmodern view and the Romantic view of authorship is 
the willingness of the former to divorce the creator from his work. 
Whereas the Romantic vision of authorship features the solitary au-
thor from whom entire works emanate, the postmodern view recog-
nizes the collaborative nature of authorship, both as part of the 
creative process and as part of the interpretive process. Both author-
ship and interpretation are indeterminate and variable no matter 
what name appears on the cover of the book. 
This focus on the text rather than on the identity or persona of 
the author exists in legal as well as literary doctrine.40 In contract law, 
for example, the starting interpretive position is the "four corners of 
the contract," and one moves to parol evidence only when the mean-
ing of the text is ambiguous.41 (Of course, a contract is only ambigu-
37 BuRKE, supra note 36, at 22-23; see also BARTHES, supra note 16, at 146-47 ("We 
know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning 
(the 'message' of the Author-God) .... [T]o refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to 
refuse God .... "). 
38 Foucault, supra note 23. 
39 ld. at 147. 
40 See RicHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND LITERATURE 211 (rev. ed. 1998). 
In the case of documents, whether literary or legal, "interpretation" just 
means reading to make whatever kind of sense one happens to be interested 
in. This might coincide with the writer's intended meaning, but equally it 
might be a sense that the reader wants to impress on the writing for reasons 
remote from anything the writer had in mind. 
Id. As Annabel Patterson points out, legal interpretation, like literary interpretation, 
has long exhibited a tension between the desire to establish the meaning of a text by 
attempting to determine authorial intent and the recognition in practice that the 
meaning of any text can (and should) change over time. Patterson, supra note 28, at 
135-36. 
41 See PosNER, supra note 40, at 219. 
[The New Critics' approach to text corresponds] to the common practice of 
interpreting contracts without reference to "extrinsic" evidence such as testi-
mony by the parties as to what they meant by ambiguous terms-that is, 
evidence other than the document itself and the cultural background neces-
sary to understand the words and sentences in the document and the pur-
poses of contract interpretation. 
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ous or unambiguous in the eyes of the reader.) Strict constructionists 
or proponents of the "plain meaning" rule in statutory interpreta-
tion42 take a similar approach to legislation, refusing to resort to legis-
lative history in interpreting the meaning of the text.43 In 
determining the "meaning" of a judicial opinion, to take a third exam-
ple, we typically treat the text of the opinion as sacrosanct. We (and I 
am including lower courts in this) do not formally inquire of the 
authoring judge to determine his intentions in writing a particular 
opinion or even conduct research into the judge's personal back-
ground or history or extrajudicial writings to give meaning to the 
words in the opinion. Rather, we focus solely on the words of the 
opinion, pondering the turns in the language and attempting to come 
up with our interpretation of its meaning.44 The occurrence of circuit 
splits and the proliferation of law review articles only attest to the 
truth of the theory: that of multiplicity of meaning, depending on the 
reader. (And the Supreme Court functions both as the ultimate 
reader-as Justice Jackson famously noted "not final because [it is] 
infallible, but ... infallible only because [it is] final"45-and as the 
ultimate author, engendering in its reading a new text to interpret.) 
The one area in which the deconstruction of authorship might 
expect to find resistance is in copyright law, which centers its entire 
bundle of rights on a notion of authorship. In order to be protected 
by copyright, for example, a work must be sufficiently original and 
/d. Similarly, Robert Rotstein has noted that defamation law "also regards the text as 
a reader-dependent process" in that whether or not a particular statement is defama-
tory depends on how it is perceived by the audience deemed to be its recipient. See 
Rotstein, supra note 35, at 741 n .73. 
42 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip R. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. 
REv. 26, 97 (1994) . 
43 See STANLEY FISH, Narmal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the 
Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, in Is 
THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASs: THE AuTHORilY OF INTERPRETIVE CoMMUNITIES 268, 280 
(1980). 
!d. 
It is your specification of the makers' intention that tells you what is in the 
statute, not your literal reading of the statute that informs you as to its mak-
ers' intention. This would seem to suggest that one need only recover the 
makers' intention in order to arrive at the correct literal reading; but the doc-
uments (including even verbatim reports) that would give us that intention 
are no more available to a literal reading (are no more uninterpreted) than 
the literal reading it would yield. 
44 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Death of the Author, lJy Himself, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
111, Ill (1994) . 
45 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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fixed in a tangible medium of expression,46 which seems to suggest at 
least a nod to authorial intent. 47 But U.S. copyright law doesn't re-
quire that the creator of a work be the person identified as the work's 
"author." It is concerned not with identifying the true creator-the 
person who actually put pen to paper-but merely with the legal fic-
tion of the author, 48 a statement of authorship subject only to ex post 
challenge and not to ex ante proof. Copyright's view of authorship 
allows an author to be identified with a pseudonym; it allows a celeb-
rity author to claim authorship credit for a ghostwritten work; it per-
mits works for hire, in which the creator's employer is deemed the 
legal author;49 and it allows a writer to assign the copyright in any text 
he produces.50 The courts, as Peter Jaszi has noted, comfort them-
selves that awarding copyright to an employer in a work-for-hire scena-
46 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000); Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 355 (1991) (quoting H.R REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976)). 
47 See Monroe E. Price & Malia Pollack, The Author in Copyright: Notes for the Liter-
ary Critic, in THE CoNSTRUCTION or AuniORSHIP, supra note 15, at 439, 446-48 (con-
trasting three tests of authorship) . 
48 RosE, supra note 13, at 136 ("In the discourse of copyright, then, the goal of 
protecting the rights of the creative author is proudly asserted even as the notion of 
author is drained of content."); Rose, supra note 21, at 46 (noting that the reaction of 
Lord Hailes to a claim that the Reverend Thomas Stackhouse's History of the Holy Bible 
was protected by common-law copyright was to contend that the claimants "were im-
properly conferring the name of 'original author' on a mere 'tasteless compiler'" 
(citing jAMES BosWELL, THE DECISION oF THE CouRT OF SEssioN UPON THE QuESTION 
OF LITERARY PROPERTY 7 (Edinburgh, James Donaldson 1774) ; Saunders, supra note 
21, at 96 ("Legal status and cultural standing, it can be said, were separate historical 
inventions, deriving not from a singular and fundamental process of subject-forma-
tion but from the organizational conditions obtaining in separate spheres of exis-
tence."); Saunders & Hunter, supra note 23, at 493 ("[The Statute of Anne] does not 
assume or require a necessary equivalence between the person of the copyright owner 
and the aesthetic persona of the writer, even on those occasions where the writer 
holds copyright."). 
49 Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 12 (2004) 
("Under this doctrine, individual employees who create copyrightable works while 
operating within the scope of their employment are not considered to be the authors 
of those works. Rather, the institution employing the creator becomes the legally 
recognized author."). For another example of this phenomenon, see Building Offi-
cials and Code Administrators v. Code Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) 
("The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who 
actually drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of 
the public, expressed through the democratic process."). 
50 See 17 U.S.C. § 20l(d) (providing for transfer of ownership); Griffin, supra 
note 23, at 889 (noting the lack of a "cause-and-effect relation" between ownership 
and the presence or absence of the author's name as a historical matter because 
"[n]aming and copyright protection operate on separate levels of discourse and in-
volve separate sets of decisions on the part of the writer") . 
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rio is consistent with the Romantic vision of authorship because it is 
the employer who provides the "inspiration" for creation,51 but this 
seems entirely contrary to the patronage system against which the idea 
of the Romantic author developed. 52 U.S. copyright law thus (proba-
bly unconsciously) embodies a deconstructed view of authorship in 
which there is no presumption of unity between the individual or indi-
viduals responsible for creation and the person or entity identified to 
the public as the "author" of the work. Thus, as David Saunders has 
noted, "in the Romantic historicist model, it was always to be the role 
of copyright law to support the authorial personality required and en-
shrined by Romanticism"; in the post-structuralist model, "it was al-
ways to be the role of copyright law to support the illusion of the 
authorial personality, for instance as proprietor of copyright."53 
B. The Birth of the Authornym 
If the Romantic fiction of the author were indeed true, one might 
expect to see some sort of jealous guardianship of authorial identity. 
If we should give pride of place to the individual creator, we would 
want to discourage any identification of that creator that diminished 
recognition of his creative genius. Pseudonyms would be discouraged 
as an attempt to attribute the work to a (fictional) individual other 
than the true author, and corporate writing efforts, in which some 
other individual or entity is credited with the work of others, would be 
socially or legally disallowed. 
But authorship doesn't function this way. Writers have not histor-
ically hesitated to, for example, attribute their work to a patron or 
other benefactor, or to another author, or to a pen name, or to no 
51 Jaszi, supra note 22, at 298; see also, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 
F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (describing the employer as the motivating factor for 
the work). 
52 Cf, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEx. 
L. REv. 873, 882-83 (1997) (book review) (noting the disconnect between the corpo-
ration and the individualistic view of romantic authorship). 
53 DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 216-17 (1992); see also, e.g., 
RosEMARY J. CooMBE, THE CuLTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, 
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAw 284-85 (1998). This may particularly be the case given 
that legal scholars are, of course, authors, who may well have a vested interest in 
preserving the Romantic view of authorship. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 44, at 111 
("To be told that texts 'are'-or at the very least will become-what readers make of 
them is to deprive Romantic authors of something they believe to be at the core of 
their activity."). Of course, as Tushnet describes, texts are often taken to "mean" 
whatever the critical consensus concludes that they mean, notwithstanding authorial 
intent. See id. at 114. 
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source at all. 54 Ghostwriters do much of the work attributed to more 
famous "authors," including biographies, speeches, and press release 
"quotations." Research assistants and editors contribute text to many 
scholarly works. The benefits flowing from a work made for hire ac-
crue to the corporate author and not to the individual employee who 
created the work. 55 If it were truly the case that the notion of author-
ship were as exalted as the Romantic proponents would have us be-
lieve, it would seem that the culture would not permit-or, at least, 
would not implicitly support-such a laxity in attribution values. 
But our social and legal norms are based not on the author as a 
unified being, but rather on something of an accepted falsehood: that 
the name given as the author of the text is just a name. It may be the 
author's true name or it may be a pseudonym; it may identifY a single 
author or mask a corporate writing effort. The name may, over time, 
become invested with biography or meaning, but it has none at its 
genesis because we cannot presume that it tells us anything factual 
a tout the genesis of the work with which it is associated. In this norm, 
then, the author is not a unified being but a dual one: the creator or 
creators of the work and the name to which the work is attributed. 56 
The separation between the fact of authorship and a statement of 
authorship allows authors relatively free choice among various forms 
54 For a historical view of pseudonymity in political authorship, see, for example, 
Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Courl and the Right to Anonymity, 
2001-2002 Guo SuP. CT. REv. 57, 57-60; Comment, The Constitutional Right toAno-
nymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE LJ. 1084, 1084-85 (1961). The 
literary theorist Gerard Genette describes seven types of historical pseudonymity: 
(1) complete omission of the name (anonymity); false attribution of the text to an-
other author (apocrypha), either (2) with permission or (3) without permission; false 
attribution of another's text to oneself either ( 4) with permission (ghostwriting) or 
(5) without permission (plagiarism); (6) attributing the text to a fictional author 
(what Genette calls "imagining the author"); and (7) attributing the text to a name 
other than one's own (pseudonymity). GENETTE, supra note 20, at 47-48. 
55 Burk, supra note 49, at 14. 
!d. 
By erasing the identity of the natural creator, work made for hire removes 
from the natural author a reputational interest that is otherwise specific to 
the natural person, and not the finn . ... Thus, an 'asset specificity' ap-
proach suggests that authorship and ownership should perhaps be bifur-
cated under work made for hire, allocating the reputational interest to the 
natural author even while assigning default ownership of the work to the 
firm. 
56 And possibly not simply a dual being but a triadic one, if we include the fic-
tional persona of the author to whom the name of the author at least metaphorically 
attaches. Cf. Beebe, supra note 2, at 646 (discussing the triadic structuration of the 
trademark). 
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of authorial attribution. A writer can write under her own name or 
under a pseudonym; if she chooses a pseudonym, she can choose one 
that is plain or exotic, gender neutral or gender suggestive. A group 
of authors writing collectively can choose to list each participant as an 
author or to devise a name for the group and attribute authorship to 
that entity. Samuel L. Clemens can write as "Mark Twain" without 
being accused of deception or falsehood and indeed, over time, may 
establish the pseudonym as a more accepted statement of authorship 
than his real name. 
Although "pseudonym" is the word that comes to mind most 
readily to describe these choices of authorship statement, the word is 
not particularly apt. Typically when we refer to a "pseudonym" in the 
authorial context, we mean a pen name-a name under which the 
writer distributes his work, often sounding very much like a given 
name, with both first and last name components (or occasionally a 
single moniker like "Publius"), but that typically bears no resemblance 
to the author's real name. From the reader's perspective, however, a 
pseudonym is like any author's name, real or devised: a statement of 
authorship, the name that the reader is to credit with the work that he 
or she is reading. Thus, there is no difference in the reader's percep-
tion of authorship between "Mark Twain" and ':John Grisham," even 
though the former is a pseudonym for Samuel L. Clemens and the 
latter is, presumably, the author's true name. In neither instance does 
the name serve to identify the person who put pen to paper; rather, 
the name identifies the "author" to whom the text should be attrib-
uted. Similarly, there is no significant difference between "Mark 
Twain" and "Samuel L. Clemens" from an authorship perspective. Ex-
cept for the fact that the writer's choice between Twain and Clemens 
represents a conscious decision to associate certain works with the for-
mer and certain with the latter, there is no semiotic difference be-
tween the two such that, should the decision have been reversed, the 
reader would have been interpretatively poorer. If the typical reader's 
interaction with "Mark Twain" is wholly textual57-primarily through 
his work and secondarily through the works of others about him-
then it matters not whether the name used to collect the various 
57 The same considerations may not inhere in circumstances in which the interac-
tion between writer and reader is both textual and physical. See, e.g., David R. Millen 
& John F. Patterson, Identity Disclosure and the Creation of Social Capital, 2003 CHI NEw 
HoRIZONS 720, 720-21 (describing the "thick trust" that developed on an online site 
for residents of a small community in which users were required to identify them-
selves using their real names), available at http:/ /delivery.acm.org/10.1145/770000/ 
765950/p720-millen.pdf?key1=765950&key2=3007989011&coll=GUIDE&dl=GUIDE& 
CFID=39874070&CFTOKEN=42822378. 
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strands of that interaction is "Mark Twain" or "Samuel Clemens," 
'John Grisham," or 'John Smith."58 Except in the probably very rare 
instance of truly anonymous speech-speech that is devoid not only of 
any label but also of any characteristics that enable us to align it with 
other instances of speech-the "search for truth" that is often given as 
the justification for disallowing pseudonymous speech is still achieva-
ble through what David Post has called the "reputational capital" that 
pseudonyms attain.59 Hence, I introduce here the term "authornym" 
58 See Lee Tien, Whos Afraid of Anonymous Speech? Mcintyre and the Internet, 75 OR. 
L. REv. 117, 161 (1996). 
Knowing that a message was written by John Smith is pretty meaningless un-
less you know who John Smith is, what he stands for, and so on. Once you 
know that a pro-tobacco message was written by a tobacco industry lobbyist, 
whether he is John Smith or Jane Jones is largely irrelevant. 
/d. But see Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between 
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. P A. L. REv. 1, 7 4 ( 1991) ("To the 
extent First Amendment rights are rooted in the 'marketplace of ideas,' disclosure of 
information cannot but contribute to the functioning of that marketplace. In a well-
functioning market, more information moves the market to truth."); id. at 85. 
The identity of the speaker conveys information that improves the quality of 
discussion. An assertion by Carl Sagan regarding astronomy claims more 
credence than one by the neighborhood auto mechanic, not by virtue of 
Sagan's social position, but because of his proven judgment. If we do not 
know who is making an assertion, we must evaluate it from first principles, a 
burdensome approach indeed. 
/d. Even if Kreimer's point is true as a relative matter, it still seems that, so long as the 
authornym "Carl Sagan" is used consistently by the same speaker, Kreimer's concerns 
should be fully addressed. From the perspective of literary criticism, which is con-
cerned more with issues of interpretation than with issues of liability, the pseudony-
mous authornym and the legal authornym are essentially equivalent from the 
perspective of the effect each has on the reader. GENETTE, supra note 20, at 49. 
59 See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonym-
ity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 152 (noting that, over 
time, pseudonyms build up "reputational capital" and that without these associations 
"there is indeed no meaningful difference between anonymity and pseudonymity"); 
see also jULIAN DIBBELL, Mv TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WoRLD 23 
(1998) (noting that first-time "guest" visitors to a virtual world acted more brazenly 
than those with fixed characters who had made "the critical passage from anonymity 
to pseudonymity, developing the concern for their character's reputation that marks 
the attainment of virtual adulthood"); A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmi-
ties, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 4, par. 35, at http:/ /www.wm.edu/ law/ publications/ jol/ 
95_96/ froomkin.html; Gary T. Marx, Whats in a Name? Some Reflections on the Sociology 
of Anonymity, at http:/ /web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/ anon.html (last visited Feb. 27, 
2005) ("Persons making anonymous postings to a computer bulletin board may come 
to be 'known ' by others because of the content, tone, or style of their communica-
tions."). But see Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self: Fleshing Out the Rights of Elec-
tronic Personalities, 13 J. MARsHALL]. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 13 (1994) (concluding 
that electronic personae are not .in need of free speech rights because "[w]hen we 
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to avoid the misperception that "pseudonym" causes and to encom-
pass all statements of authorship, whether textually equivalent to the 
author's true name or invented. 
Our experience with authorship reveals three kinds of 
authornyms. "One-to-many" authornyms are various statements of au-
thorship used by a single individual to explore alternative authorial 
identities, whether those alternative identities are based in gender, 
race, sexual orientation, writing style, or some other attribute. Corpo-
rate authornyms, by contrast, are "many-to-one" authornyms; they are 
authornyms used to collate the works of several individuals, whether 
contemporaneously or over time. Corporate authornyms may take 
the name of an individual or an entity; in either case, they tend to 
feature a corporate style that unifies the works distributed under the 
authornyms. And finally, "one-to-one" authornyms describe what we 
would typically characterize as the author writing under his "real" 
name, despite the fact that the name is "real" to us only as a statement 
of authorship and not otherwise. All three types are in abundance not 
only in the traditional world of authorship but also online, which, as 
many have noted,60 is a realm that fosters identity experimentation 
and so is a fruitful place to look for examples of authornymous 
writing.6I 
1. One-to-Many Authomyms 
A single individual who chooses various identities through which 
to express himself or herself may have any one of a number of reasons 
for doing so. In some instances, the choice is one of gender morph-
ing: the ability of a writer of one gender to brand himself (or, more 
typically, herself) as a writer assumed to be of the other gender. 
Sometimes this act of branding is described in heroic terms;62 in other 
talk, we generally want to be recognized as the speaker, because we are proud of our 
thoughts and because others often do not take kindly to anonymous discourse: credi-
bility and the power of the word are still frequently ad hominem affairs"). 
60 See generally, e.g., SHERRY TuRKLE, LIFE oN THE ScREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AcE OF 
THE INTERNET (1995);Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, ll3 HAR.v. L. REv. ll31 (2000). 
61 Indeed, because communication via the Internet often requires a speaker to 
choose a "screen name" before he can begin speaking, the Internet may yield the 
clearest example of how a singular authornym is essentially pseudonymous. When 
there is no presumption that one's authorial identity will be the textual equivalent of 
one's true name, the choice of the singular authomym can be seen only as a con-
scious statement of authorship. 
62 See, e.g., 1 SANDRA M. GILBERT & SusAN GusAR, No MAN's LANo: THE PLACE OF 
THE WoMAN WRITER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 185, 240-42 (1988) (describing shift 
in pseudonymity of women writers from the late nineteenth century to the early twen-
tieth century as moving from a "mask behind which the female writer could hide her 
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instances, gender branding is a more defensive measure that allows 
the female writer to obtain an authorial freedom not available to her 
under her own name.6·3 In still other instances, the choice is less a 
matter of individual identity fulfillment and more a matter of con-
sumer expectations. As Saul Levmore has suggested, if readers of ro-
mance novels expect those novels to be written by female authors, 
publishers have an economic incentive to fulfill that expectation by 
creating a feminine sounding authornym for their male authors.64 
And this appears to be historically confirmed: At least one male writer 
seeking to appeal to a female audience of a certain type in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries published his works under 
disreputable femininity" to one in which the pseudonym functioned as "the mark of a 
private christening into a second self, a rebirth into linguistic primacy"). 
63 See, e.g., VIRGINIA WooLF, A RooM OF ONE's OWN 54 (1929) ("It was the relic of 
the sense of chastity that dictated anonymity to women even so late as the nineteenth 
century."). Margaret Ezell questions the conventional wisdom that when early mod-
em women authors engaged in pseudonymous authorship, it was because pseudo-
nymity was "imposed, not selected": 
[I]f cultural sanction against women being on public display in print was so 
encompassing and if the function of selecting anonymity of a pseudonym 
was to disguise the gender of the author to permit her speak, what are we to 
make of the selection of"By a Lady" as being one of the period's more popu-
lar solutions, a label which confronts the reader with the writer's gender, 
often as part of the very title of the work? Why was the choice of women 
writing during this period not simply "Anon" or the strategy adopted by 
nineteenth-century women writers, the adoption of male names? 
.. . How well did such sobriquets function as a shield for the female 
author, hiding or disguising her identity and protecting her from acquiring 
a "reputation"? Could they serve more as a costume rather than as a dis-
guise, a means to signify to the reader that a certain type of role was being 
performed, a type of personality was being staged, rather than being simply a 
way to hide the true identity of the individual? 
MargaretJ.M. Ezell, "By a Lady": The Mask of the Feminine in Restoration, Early Eighteenth-
Century Print Culture, in THE FACES OF ANoNYMilY, supra note 19, at 63, 64; see also 
Paula R. Feldman, Women Poets and Anonymity in the Romantic Era, 33 NEw LITERARY 
HisT. 279, 279-83 (2002) (contending that women poets during the period from 
1770 to 1835 rarely published books of verse anonymously and never published under 
a male pseudonym). At least one study (albeit one now somewhat dated, given the 
pace of the online world) suggests that women are more likely than men to adopt 
cross-gender pseudonyms in the online world; interestingly, the study also found that 
the communicative equalization that resulted from this adoption occurred not be-
cause the pseudonymous "men" spoke in stereotypically male patterns of discourse 
but because the male participants in the study (using male-gendered pseudonyms) 
tended to speak in more feminized modes of discourse online. J. Michael Jaffee et al. , 
Gender, Pseudonyms, and CMC: Masking Identities and Baring Souls (1995), at http:/ I 
members.iworld.net/yesunny I genderps.html. 
64 Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U . PA. L. REv. 2191, 2213-14 (1996). 
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the feminine authornym of "a Lady" (as in "By a Lady") in order to 
attract the audience he sought.65 
In other instances, the authornymous choice is used for a form of 
racial or ethnic masking, in which the author takes on not only a 
racialized authorial attribution but a racialized authorial identity in 
creating his text.66 As in other instances, such authorial masking is 
often undertaken in order to permit the author to experiment with 
other identities,67 to write in an area presumed to be off-limits,68 or-
in the case of early slave narratives authored by white writers-to gain 
authenticity for a particular political view that was deemed to be un-
achievable otherwise. 69 Because this particular choice of authornym 
inherently involves claimed (or presumed) membership in a racial or 
ethnic group, the reaction of the readership once the mask of the 
authornym is removed is sometimes one of betrayal or anger at what 
appears to be an act of cultural misappropriation. One such example 
is the novel The Education of Little Tree, which purported to be the biog-
raphy of a Native American youth named Forrest Carter and was later 
65 Ezell, supra note 63, at 74; see alwjames Raven, The Anonymous Novel in Britain 
and Ireland, 1750-1830, in THE FACES OF ANoNYMITY, supra note 19, at 141, 145 (not-
ing that almost a third of all novels published in Britain and Ireland in 1785 and 
nearly a quarter in 1787 were "by a Lady"). 
As Susan Lanser has written, the gender implied by a gendered authomym is a 
"reading effect" that is not "a tautological equivalent to the real author, but an autho-
rial position that the text wittingly or unwittingly assumes." Susan S. Lanser, The Au-
thor's Queer Clothes: Anonymity, Sex(uality), and The Travels and Adventures of 
Mademoiselle de Richelieu, in THE FACES OF ANoNYMITY, supra note 19, at 81, 97. 
66 See, e.g., LAuRA BRoWDER, SuPPERY CHARACTERS: ETHNIC IMPERSONATORS AND 
AMERICAN IDENTITIES (2000). Jerry Kang provides a consideration of this kind of 
masking in the Internet context and outlines three possibilities for race in cyberspace: 
abolition (in which race, and therefore racial identification, is nonexistent), integra-
tion (in which the geographic and class-straddling nature of the Internet enhances 
understanding among different racial groups), and transmutation (in which racial 
identification, and therefore racial characterization, is fluid). Kang, supra note 60, at 
1154-205; see also Margaret Chon, Erasing Race?: A Critical Race Feminist View of Internet 
Identity-Shifting, 3 J. GENDER RAcE & jusT. 439 (2000) . 
67 I thank Kirsten Carlson for inspiring me to note here that this literary device is 
not always used in support of authorial freedom; some writers have chosen to mask 
identity in order to create mocking or otherwise harmful caricatures of those in the 
same group as the new authorial identity. 
68 See, e.g., Elaine K Ginsberg, Introduction: The Politics of Passing, in PASSING AND 
THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY 1, 16 (Elaine K Ginsberg ed., 1996) ("In its interrogation of 
the essentialism that is the foundation of identity politics, passing has the potential to 
create a space for creative self-determination and agency: the opportunity to con-
struct new identities, to experiment with multiple subject positions, and to cross social 
and economic boundaries that exclude or oppress.") . 
69 BRoWDER, supra note 66, at 272. 
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revealed to be the work of Asa Carter, an avowed segregationist and 
supporter of George Wallace. 70 When first published, The Education of 
Little Tree was hailed as a masterpiece of Native American literature, 
selling over half a million copies, and became a necessary inclusion on 
college reading lists for courses on Native American literature. 7 I Mter 
the author's "true" identity was revealed, the same text (with nary a 
word changed) was reviled by many as a sham and a fraud, no longer 
worth reading except as a curiosity of cultural history. 72 Still another 
example is that of the award-winning 1983 novel Famous All Over Town. 
Set in a Los Angeles barrio, the novel, purported to be by the young 
Chicano author Danny Santiago and "hailed by Latino critics for its 
vibrancy and authenticity," was later revealed to be the work of Daniel 
L. James, a white, Yale-educated writer in his seventies who had "lost 
faith in his own ability to write" and had turned to "Danny Santiago" 
as "the only voice available to him. "73 
Conversely, a writer may choose an authornym to deracialize attri-
bution, to release the text from the burdens of identity and of group 
membership and allow the text to stand on its own. Robert Post, in 
discussing the work of Jurgen Habermas, describes this instance of 
discourse as "functioning as pure communication," noting that in 
Habermas's ideal "public sphere," discourse is "removed from context 
of experience and action," leading inevitably to the conclusion that 
certain traditional criteria of evaluating speech, such as class (and 
70 See, e.g. , Dan T. Carter, The Transformation of a Klansman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
1991, atA31; Henry Louis Gates,Jr., "Authenticity," or the Lesson of Little Tree, N.Y. TIMES 
BooK REv., Nov. 24, 1991, at 1; Allen Barra, The Education of Little Fraud, SALON, Dec. 
20, 2001, at http:/ /dir.salon.com/books/feature/2001/12/20/ carter/index.html. 
This may derive from the modern conception of race (albeit not always a historical 
one in the United States) as a matter of self-identification, such that an individual's 
desire to self-identify as a member of a particular race is typically taken at face value. 
71 BROWDER, supra note 66, at 132; Gates, supra note 70. 
72 Of course, the emotional context of the Forrest Carter I Asa Carter dichotomy 
detracts from the more fundamental question of authornymity at its core: whether 
Carter's efforts should be interpreted as an attempt to perpetuate a fraud on his read-
ership or an attempt to engage his readership on themes he could not otherwise write 
about without the medium of a separate authornym. See Gates, supra note 70. 
73 Id. ("Judging from the testimony of his confidant, John Gregory Dunne, Mr. 
James may well have felt that the attribution was the only just one; that 'Famous All 
Over Town' belonged to Danny Santiago before it quite belonged to Daniel James."). 
For a brief biography of Daniel James and his history as "Danny Santiago," see John 
Gregory Dunne, The Secret of Danny Santiago, N.Y. REv. OF BooKS, Aug. 16, 1984, at 17; 
see also BRoWDER, supra note 66, at 231-69. 
1402 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW (voL. 8o:4 
race and gender, to add but two more categories), must be "bracketed 
out."74 
In still other instances, writers may use authornyms to facilitate 
communication not otherwise possible given the constraints of their 
environment-a gay or lesbian individual who is not fully out, for ex-
ample, may use one identity to communicate with those to whom he 
or she has come out and a separate identity for others. McVeigh v. 
Cohen75 illustrates one such example. Timothy R. McVeigh-one 
must undoubtedly still add that he is no relation to the individual who 
bombed the Oklahoma City federal building-was seiVing aboard a 
nuclear submarine in the U.S. Navy.76 The wife of one of McVeigh's 
colleagues was coordinating a toy drive for the crew members' chil-
dren and McVeigh, interested in obtaining further information, sent 
her an e-mail from his AOL account. The e-mail was sent from the 
AOL screen name "boysrch," although the text of the e-mail was 
signed "Tim."77 Not recognizing the screen name, the wife searched 
AOL's member profile directory,78 which stated that "boysrch" was an 
AOL member named Tim who was in the military and lived in Hono-
lulu, Hawaii. The profile listed the word "gay" in the space provided 
for the member to list his or her marital status, but it did not contain a 
name, address, or phone number. 79 
After viewing the AOL member directory entry, the woman for-
warded the e-mail and the directory entry to her husband, McVeigh's 
colleague, who apparently forwarded it up the chain. Someone deter-
mined that McVeigh was likely the author of the e-mail (a conclusion 
bolstered by the Navy's unlawful retrieval of confirming information 
74 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601, 639 
(1990) (citing j0RGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
1975); 2 jORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY oF CoMMUNICATIVE AcriON (Thomas McCar-
thy trans., 1987)); see also id. at 640 (noting that this ideal is reflected in "the first 
amendment right to engage in public discourse anonymously, so that speakers can 
divorce their speech from the social contextualization which knowledge of their iden-
tities would necessarily create in the minds of their audience") . But see Kreimer, supra 
note 58, at 84 n.233 ("The problem in a less than ideal speech situation, like the 
political arena, where participants are motivated by considerations other than a 
search for the truth, is whether abstraction from identity will in fact aggravate the 
defects.") . 
75 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). 
76 Id. at 217. 
77 ld. 
78 AOL's member profile directory is available to any AOL member and contains 
information supplied wholly by the member himself in response to certain categories 
set forth by AOL. 
79 McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 217. 
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from AOL) ,80 and McVeigh was eventually investigated for violation of 
the U.S. military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy.81 McVeigh success-
fully obtained a preliminary injunction barring his discharge, arguing 
that the Navy had violated federal law in the way it had obtained the 
information from AOL, and ultimately settled both with the Navy and 
with the online service. 82 
Because the privacy violations were the cornerstone of McVeigh's 
challenge to the decision to discharge him, the opinion is largely 
viewed as reinforcing the right under federal privacy law to require 
certain legal process before personal online information can be re-
vealed. 83 But during the course of the litigation, McVeigh under-
standably chose not to take this position. He did not challenge his 
discharge on the ground that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy was 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied,84 nor did he take the posi-
tion that he was not the writer of the e-mail (in other words, that 
someone else had used his AOL account to send the correspon-
dence).85 Instead, McVeigh took the position that he hadn't "told" 
anything-that the identity he had created under the name (or 
authornym) "boysrch" was simply a separate identity.86 In interviews 
before the litigation concluded, McVeigh told reporters that he had 
used the word "gay" in the online profile as a signifier of sorts: "I did it 
basically because I have dedicated so much of my life to the military, I 
really didn't want to get married and be out to sea all the time. Nor 
did I want to have children and not be there to see them grow up."87 
In a later interview, McVeigh stated: "You can put in [your profile that 
you are] male or female, that you are green or blue or purple. That 
80 Id. 
81 /d.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (setting forth the military's policy) . 
82 McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 217-20. The court found McVeigh substantially likely 
to succeed on the merits of his argument that the government had violated 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703, part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), in re-
questing the information from AOL without appropriate process. /d. at 219-20. 
83 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 V AND. L. REv. 
1609, 1628-29, 1635-36 (1999). 
84 As the district court suggested, this position had been taken unsuccessfully a 
number of times. See McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 218 (citing cases). 
85 See id. at 217-18 ("At the hearing, the Plaintiff made an unsworn oral state-
ment that explained the substance of his email to Ms. Heyne, and thus by inference 
confirmed his authorship of the correspondence."). 
86 Plaintiff's Complaint at~~ 64(C) , 68(C), M cVeigh (No. 98-116) , available at 
http:/ I dont.stanford.edu/ cases/ mcveigh/ mcveigh.complaint.htm. 
87 Gregg K. Kakesako, Senior Chief Says Navy Wants to Kick Him Out, Saying H e's 
Gay, HoNOLULU STAR BuLLETIN, Nov. 26, 1997, at AI. 
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doesn't make it true."88 While McVeigh's authomymic claim may 
have been motivated by litigation strategy, it did not go unnoticed by 
the court, which noted that "[p]articularly in the context of cyber-
space, a medium of 'virtual reality' that invites fantasy and affords ano-
nymity, the comments attributed to McVeigh do not by definition 
amount to a declaration of homosexuality. At most, they express 'an 
abstract preference or desire to engage in homosexual acts.' "89 
A final expansion of identity through authornym is one that is 
focused solely on authorial identity, as opposed to any "real world" 
identity. In this technique, an author chooses an authornym not to 
experiment with gender, race, or sexuality, but rather to experiment 
with different modes of authorship.90 Here, too, the decision to write 
pseudonymously in a different literary style may be motivated in part 
by a desire to compartmentalize reader reaction.91 The late Columbia 
University humanities professor Carolyn G. Heilbrun, for example, 
published numerous mystery novels under the authornym "Amanda 
88 Gregg K. Kakesako, Navy Insists Pearl Harbor Sailor Is Gay; Discharge Proceedings 
Are Set for Friday, HONOLULU STAR BuUETIN, Jan. 14, 1998, at AS; see also Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell (National Public Radio broadcast,Jan. 19, 1998) (airing a statement of Ann 
Beeson, Staff Attorney, ACLU: "I could say [in an AOL profile] my name is Joe Blow 
and, you know, that I'm [a] 50-year-old male. And I may not be. That just is my 
profile on AOL. "). 
89 McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 219 (quoting DEP'T OF DEFENSE, GUIDELINES FOR FAcr-
FINDING INQUIRIES INTO HoMosExuAL CoNDucr, DEPARTMENT oF DEFENSE DrREcr£VE 
No. 1332.14 (1993)); see also Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1657 ("For McVeigh, self-
determination involved his finding a path between at least two aspects of his personal-
ity, the distinguished military veteran and 'boysrch,' whose AOL profile stated an in-
terest in 'boy watching' and 'collecting pies of other young studs."' ). For a more 
general discussion of the McVeigh case, see Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, 
Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 159 (2003). 
90 See Joyce Carol Oates, Success and the Pseudonymous Writer: Turning Over a New 
Self, N.Y. TIMES BooK REv., Dec. 6, 1987, at 12 ("It may be that, after a certain age, our 
instinct for anonymity is as powerful as that for identity-or, more precisely, for an 
erasure of the primary self in that another (hitherto undiscovered?) self may be 
released."). 
91 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 63, at 279 (noting that gentry during the late 
1700s and early 1800s would publish anonymously so as not to diminish their social 
status "by appearing to be 'in trade' ") ; Donald W. Foster, Commentary: In the Name of 
the Author, 33 NEw LITERARY HIST. 375, 379 (2002) ("Anonymous publication was a 
fundamentally democratic activity that allowed writers from every social rank to pub-
lish and to seek recognition for their work, while shielding their dignity, modesty, or 
privacy from trespass, and their name from being too closely associated with the prod-
uct of a moment's leisure."); Tien, supra note 58, at 133 ("By delinking message from 
messenger, both are decontextualized. An example might be a creative talent who 
wishes to experiment in a different genre. By not exhibiting her work under her true 
name, she risks less of herself."). 
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Cross" because, in part, she writes: "There was no question in my mind 
then, nor is there any now, that had those responsible for my promo-
tion to tenure in the English department of the university where I 
teach known of the novels, they would have counted them heavily 
against me; I would probably have been rejected."92 The Victorian 
novelist Walter Scott, to take another example, did not sign his name 
to Waverly because, he wrote: "In truth, I am not sure it would be 
considered quite decorous for me as a Clerk of Sessions to write 
novels. Judges being monks clerks are a sort of lay-brethren from 
whom some solemnity of walk and conduct may be expected."93 The 
Newsweek columnist Joe Klein's authorship of Primary Colors, a thinly 
veiled fictionalized account of the presidential campaign of Bill Clin-
ton, under the authornym "Anonymous" is another such example.94 
92 CARoLYN G. HEILBRUN, WRITING A WoMAN's LIFE 110 (1988). Upon later reflec-
tion, Heilbrun expressed her choice in less deferential tenns: 
I had a very good reason for secrecy, but as I now perceive, the secrecy itself 
was wonderfully attractive. Secrecy is power. True, one gives up recognition 
and publicity and fame, should any be coming one's way, but for me that was 
not difficult. . . . I think that secrecy gave me a sense of control over my 
destiny that nothing else in my life, in those pre-tenure, pre-women's-move-
ment days, afforded. 
Id. at 116-17. 
93 Robert]. Griffin, Introduction to THE FACES OF ANoNYMilY, supra note 19, at 1, 
8; see also Feldman, supra note 63, at 286 (noting that Romantic-era poets would adopt 
pseudonyms when engaging in controversial subject matter or to distinguish state-
ments of authorship directed at different audiences). 
94 Of course, one might argue that "Anonymous" is a statement of anonymity 
rather than pseudonymity. But that would be wrong. As Klein no doubt intended, 
"Anonymous" became a persona in his own right, as would-be literary detectives tried 
to detennine his "true" identity by identifying some of his characteristics. Klein him-
self has noted that he adopted the pseudonym to allow the novel to be judged on its 
own merits rather than by association with his other work. See Michael Cromartie, 
Anonymous No More (Nov. 1, 1996), at http:/ / www.eppc.org/ publications/ pubiD.91 / 
pub_detail.asp; see also Anne Ferry, Anonymity: The Literary History of a Word, 33 NEW 
LITERARY HIST. 193, 194 (2002) (describing use of "Anon." as a shorthand statement 
of authorship when the name of the writer was unknown) . Doris Lessing took a simi-
lar tack in writing The Diaries of Jane Somers as 'jane Somers" rather than under her 
well-known true name. See DoRis LESSING, THE DIARIES OF jANE SoMERS, at vii (2d ed. 
1984) (stating that she did not want readers ' judgment of the work to be tainted with 
judgments derived from reading the works of "Doris Lessing"); id. at viii (noting that 
as Jane Somers, Lessing "wrote in ways that Doris Lessing cannot"). The phenome-
non has even spread to the music industry. See Tom Moon, Welsh Rock Vets Pull a Fast 
One, ARizoNA DAILY STAR (Tucson), Mar. 24, 2004, at E3 (describing how a 1980s rock 
group created a fake band with younger members to serve as the face for a new re-
lease so that "people [would get] behind the song on its merits"), available at http:/ I 
www.azstamet.com/ dailystar/ printDS/ 15010.php. 
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Of course, the foregoing discussion does not include the many 
other reasons for multiplicity of authorial identity-still others in-
clude the desire to subordinate identity to the broader purpose of the 
text (the Holocaust survivor who wishes his memoir to act as the voice 
of all victims) 95 or the desire to signal a particular textual interpreta-
tion to readers through the choice of authornym.96 In all these exam-
ples, however, the authorial voice is multiplied, or fractured, but it is 
done with deliberateness. The writer who chooses to express himself 
through an authornym is making an affirmative, identity-creating deci-
sion, a branding of identity, in a way that a writer who simply scrawls 
graffiti on a wall is not: He is indicating his desire to have a particular 
set of creative expressions associated with a particular identity, albeit 
not always the one he uses for other pursuits.97 
2. Many-to-One Authornyms 
Besides the expansion of identity, which enables voice experi-
mentation, authornyms also permit the contraction of identity-a 
"many-to-one" authorial voice, or what is often referred to as "corpo-
95 See Jeremy D. Popkin, Ka-Tzetnik 135633: The Suroivor as Pseudonym, 33 NEw 
LITERARY HIST. 343, 344-46 (2002) (contrasting pseudonymous authorship of Holo-
caust narrative Salamandra (1946) with memoirists who wrote under their proper 
names as "a proof of endurance"); see also, e.g., Ferry, supra note 94, at 197 (describing 
the use of anonymity by poets to "escape over-personal interpretations of their 
poems"); Henry Hazlitt, The Cult of Anonymity, 131 NATION 350, 350 (1930) (descrilr 
ing a group of writers in Paris who withheld their names from their writings "to curb 
the exploitation of personalities, and to establish 'the art as an ideal, not the ego'") . 
96 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 23, at 886 (discussing how author Mary Robinson's 
use of the pseudonym "Tabitha Bramble," the name of a character in Smollett's Hum-
phry Clinker, "functions as a signal to the reader to expect a dramatized, and clearly 
fictional, point of view"). 
There are, of course, still other reasons why an author might write under a sepa-
rate authomym. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, some authors 
chose pseudonyms to "limit the appearance of overproduction." See, e.g., Raven, supra 
note 65, at 158. A version of this effort can be seen today when online speakers in 
particular create distinct identities in order to present both sides of a debate more 
effectively and spark discussion in a way that might not be possible were both sides 
presented by a single "author." See Bill Flinn & Hermann Maurer, Levels of Anonymity, 
1 J. UNIVERSAL CoMPUTER Sci. 35, 39 (1995), available at http:/ /wwwJucs.org/ 
jucs_l_l/levels_of_anonymity; Philip Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in 
Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TEcH. L. REv. 1, 1 12. 
97 In this respect, the choice of an authornym might have one constant character-
istic: the desire to bolster the effectiveness of the speech by presenting that speech 
under a particular brand (or, put differently, to increase the likelihood that readers/ 
consumers will "buy" what is offered) as opposed to releasing textual product to the 
market without any indication of source (i.e., truly anonymously). 
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rate" authorship.98 In this mode, writers use authornyrns to collect 
the corporate efforts of a body of writers under the name of a single 
author. Works for hire, in which the corporation is the putative au-
thor,99 are perhaps the most prevalent form, but we also see such cor-
porate writing efforts occurring in popular literature as well: 100 The 
Nancy Drew series, for example, has been written for years by 
"Carolyn Keene," whose name masks a stable of authors trained in a 
corporate fictional styh~, 101 and the "Abby" of "Dear Abby" fame has 
been over the years both Abigail Van Buren (itself a pseudonym) and 
her daughter. 102 In some instances, as Peter Jaszi and Martha Wood-
mansee have noted, the corporate writing endeavor exists even when 
the public persona projected is one of the Romantic, solitary au-
98 See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 40, at 258; Griffin, supra note 93, at 10-11; Andrea 
A. Lunsford & Lisa Ede, Collaborative Authorship and the Teaching of Writing, in THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 15, at 417, 418. Indeed, as David Post 
points out, the effort may be truly "corporate." Post, supra note 59, at 158. 
!d. 
[T] hough we do not generally think of corporate speech as an example of 
pseudonymous speech, it clearly falls within that category. When I receive 
an advertising flyer from my local McDonald's restaurant, identified only by 
a prominently placed corporate logo ... the message is an "anonymous" 
one, inasmuch as it contains no information at all about the identity of the 
individual(s) who may have typed it up, reproduced it, or placed it under my 
door. But it is also clearly within the subset of pseudonymous messages be-
cause the presence of the logo provides a great deal of information about 
the recognizable (corporate) entity responsible for preparing and distribut-
ing the flyer. 
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). 
100 Although this Article is focused on literary works, other works subject to copy-
right (and therefore that have "authors") such as musical works, theater, and films are 
more obviously examples of corporate authorship. RosE, supra note 13, at viii. 
101 The "Stratemeyer Syndicate," a stable of ghostwriters founded by Edward 
Stratemeyer, was responsible for the Nancy Drew, Bobbsey Twins, and Hardy Boys 
series, among others. See Patricia Leigh Brown, A Ghostwriter and Her Sleuth: 63 Year.s 
of Smarts and Gumption, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, at E7; Susan Chira, Harriet Adams 
Dies; Nancy Drew Author Wrote 200 Novels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1982, at AI; Meghan 
O'Rourke, Nancy Drew's Father, THE NEw YoRKER, Nov. 8, 2004, at 120. 
102 See, e.g., Amy Wilson, Dear Abby and Daughter: jeanne Phillips Is Now Co-Writer of 
Her Mother's Column, WASH. PosT, Aug. 22, 2001, at Cll; cJ. Alex Kuczynski, "Ann 
Landers" May Write Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, § 9, at 7 (discussing the Chicago 
Tribune's search to find a replacement for Eppie Lederer, who wrote as Ann Landers 
until her death). Early modern women writers also used this technique, often taking 
on a joint authomym that comprised some portion of each writer's first or last names. 
See, e.g., Holly A. Laird, The Coauthored Pseudonym: Two Women Named Michael Field, in 
THE FACES OF ANONYMI'lY, supra note 19, at 193, 194-95. 
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thor. 103 Indeed, this many-into-one form of authornymity occurs fre-
quently in legal writing. A federal judge who employs law clerks to 
assist him with the drafting of opinions will undoubtedly not be the 
"true" author of some of the words attributed to him, although each 
opinion issued out of his chambers bears his name, and each opinion 
tends to read in the same style (although whether this is due to edit-
ing or to law clerks' learning to assume the corporate style is undoubt-
edly variable in each case).104 And a court rriay issue an opinion per 
curiam, without further attribution, even though it is the work of one 
or more judges on the panel and may bear the stylistic hallmarks of its 
author or authors such that more accurate attribution could be 
achieved. 105 
The modern consumer of cultural commodities is undoubtedly 
well familiar with the concept of corporate authorship. The political 
speechwriter, for example, is an invisible yet omnipresent author 
whose pseudonymous existence causes no particular consternation to 
the readers of his work.106 The common use of screen names or user 
103 jaszi & Woodmansee, supra note 15, at 3 (describing William Wordsworth's 
collaboration with Samuel Taylor Coleridge and reliance on writings of his sister Dor-
othy despite "the authorial persona he projects publicly-that of the secular prophet 
with privileged access to experience of the numinous and a unique ability to translate 
that experience for the masses of less gifted consumers"); Woodmansee, supra note 
15, at 17 (noting that although history presents Samuel johnson as "the very arche-
type of the modern author," most of his writing efforts were collaborative); see gener-
ally ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARlSM AND 0RIGINAUIY (1952). 
104 PosNER, supra note 40, at 258. 
/d. 
Law clerks often prepare for their job by reading a bunch of their boss's old 
opinions (sometimes he tells them to do this), and they model their own 
style on that of the opinions they read. By this process a chambers style, not 
perhaps very distinctive but distinctive enough to be recognizable, evolves. 
All that this shows is that style, like intention, can be a corporate attribute. 
105 On the use of per curiam opinions, see generally Richard Lowell Nygaard, The 
Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an Old Colleague, 5 ScRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41 
(1994-1995); Laura Krugman Ray, TheRnad to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme 
Court's Use of the Per Curiam opinion, 79 NEB. L. REv. 517 (2000) . And, to take this 
point one level higher, the opinions of any single judge can also be described as 
issued under the authomym of the court on which she sits. Except in the case of 
certain "star" judges-not coincidentally, usually those with distinctive writing styles-
most judicial opinions are referred to in common parlance as, for example, a "Ninth 
Circuit opinion" rather than as a "judge X opinion." 
106 Of course, this may not be true where political actors employ a "one-to-many" 
form of authorship as opposed to a "many-to-one" form. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 
91, at 380 (describing the uproar that resulted when the British tabloid The Sun pub-
lished pro-British articles nominally written by the Japanese Prime Minister and Ar-
gentinean President that were believed to have been written by British Prime Minister 
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names in online communications also provides an example of corpo-
rate authorship. In any given communication under a screen name, 
there is no way to tell who is sitting at the keyboard, and so it is there-
fore possible for an online author's work product to in fact be the 
work of several individuals. Julian Dibbell, in his well-known piece A 
Rape in Cyberspace, describes one such instance in the context of a lin-
guistic sexual assault of one character by another character in an on-
line world. Although the perpetrator was known in the online 
community by the authornym "Mr. Bungle" and appeared to write in a 
consistent, characteristic mode, Dibbell later discovered that at one 
point in the online conversation (and perhaps at other, or even at all, 
times), Mr. Bungle's writing was the work of a group of college stu-
dents gathered around the keyboard and feeding material to a desig-
nated typist. 107 More benignly, we see a "many-to-one" mode of 
online authorship through Wiki, a technology that allows any visitor to 
a Wiki-enabled webpage to create and edit content, including by de-
leting or erasing content left by others.108 Thus, at any given moment, 
the "authorship" of any particular Wiki page is not only collaborative, 
but fluid, as text is added and deleted. (Indeed, the writer who deletes 
a piece of text previously contributed by another writer may have as 
much a claim to authorship in the entire piece-or even a greater 
one-as the first writer.) 109 
Tony Blair's press secretary); id. at 380-81 (describing Richard Nixon's efforts to 
place opinion pieces in major newspapers under pseudonyms or under the byline of 
a columnist "sympathetic to the administration"). 
107 See DIBBELL, supra note 59, at 30; see also Adam White Scoville, Text Is Self The 
Merger of Property and Identity, 1999 B.C. lNTELL. PRoP. & TEcH. F. 060507 ("The 
postmodern notion of communal Internet authorship presented by some on-line per-
sonae diverges radically from the romantic notion of authorship embodied in the 
copyright statute."). 
108 See, e.g., Cunningham & Cunningham, Inc., Wiki Getting Started Faq, at http: / I 
c2.com/ cgi/wiki?WikiGettingStartedFaq (last edited Feb. 26, 2005); Cunningham & 
Cunningham, Inc., Wiki Philosophy Faq, at http:/ I c2.com/ cgi/ wiki?WikiPhilosophy 
Faq (last edited Jan. 3, 2005). 
109 See, e.g., lJARRy MATHEWS, IMMEASURABLE DISTANCES 20 (1991) (describing the 
process of writing as working "exclusively by what the writer leaves out") . Wiki's "doc-
ument mode" is particularly designed for this kind of collaborative authorship, in 
which the text reflects the community consensus of the discussion. See Cunningham 
& Cunningham, Inc., Document Mode, at http:/ / c2.com/ cgi/wiki?DocumentMode 
(last edited Feb. 18, 2005) ("The piece of text is community property .... "). Of 
course, as the page itself points out (in a note of uncertain origin), so long as the 
page is hosted on a setver controlled by some third-party entity, that entity will always 
have the ability to exercise ultimate control over the site's content. !d. 
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3. One-to-One Authornyms 
The one-to-one authornym is any statement of authorship that is 
neither expansive nor corporate-in other words, any statement of 
authorship that purports to be neither the alter ego of an individual 
nor many individuals under one name. 'john Grisham," despite its 
identity with the name that, we can suppose, appears on the writer's 
birth certificate, is in fact an authornym for the writer named John 
Grisham.110 Just as the authornyms "Carolyn Heilbrun" and "Amanda 
Cross" tell us who should be attributed with the text they label, 'john 
Grisham" tells readers that the "author" of a particular piece is to be 
known by 'john Grisham," whatever the reality of the writing process. 
Grisham is choosing to write under 'john Grisham" rather than 'john 
Smith," even if that choice is not a conscious one.111 The fact that 
llO The concept of separating the function that a name performs when it is the 
name of the author from the function it performs elsewhere is a mainstay of 
postmodem literary criticism. Michel Foucault, most famously, has described the na-
ture of the author's name as different from that of a proper name because a proper 
name's identifying quality does not vary with changes to the identified person's other 
characteristics. If, as Foucault describes, "Pierre Dupont does not have blue eyes, or 
was not born in Paris, or is not a doctor, the name Pierre Dupont will still always refer 
to the same person; such things do not modify the link of designation." Foucault, 
supra note 23, at 146. But authors are different: "[I]fwe proved that Shakespeare did 
not write those sonnets which pass for his, that would constitute a significant change 
and affect the manner in which the author's name functions .... The author's name 
is not, therefore, just a proper name like the rest." Foucault, supra note 23, at 145. I 
sense in this description, and contend that there is in any event, a distinction between 
what I am referring to as an authomyrn and the proper name, even if the two are 
textually the same (i.e., the author "William Shakespeare" as distinct from the person 
named William Shakespeare). See RosE, supra note 13, at 123 (describing the late-
eighteenth-century "further step in the mystification of Shakespeare, the separation of 
the divine personality of the author of the plays from the human specificity of the 
actor-playwright-shareholder William Shakespeare"). Gerard Genette has coined the 
word "onymity" (as part of a troika of "anonymity" and "pseudonymity") to refer to 
the instance in which the author signs his work with his legal name. GENETTE, supra 
note 20, at 39. Even here, however, Genette acknowledges that "to sign a work with 
one's real name is a choice like any other, and nothing authorizes us to regard this 
choice as insignificant." /d. at 39-40. Genette further suggests, probably rightly so, 
that instances of onymity occur more often in historical or documentary works, in 
which the credibility of the work rests on the identity of the writer. /d. at 41. 
Ill On this point, see Oates, supra note 90, at 14. 
[T] he cultivation of a pseudonym might be interpreted as not so very differ-
ent from the cultivation in vivo of the narrative voice that sustains any work 
of words, making it unique and inimitable. Choosing a pseudonym by which 
to identifY the completed product simply takes the mysterious process a step 
or two further, officially erasing the author's (social) identity and sup-
planting it with the (pseudonymous) identity. 
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there is also an individual named 'John Grisham" does not render this 
choice any more illusory-it simply illustrates the distinction between 
what Foucault has called the "author function" of a name and the 
purely nominative function, between "William Shakespeare'' the play-
wright and "William Shakespeare" the man.112 
The three categories of authornyms described above may overlap 
to some extent. Because 'John Grisham" doesn't tell us whether Mr. 
Grisham alone is responsible for the text or whether an editor or 
some other individual contributed some piece of it, 'John Grisham" 
might well be a many-to-one authornym rather than a one-to-one 
authornym. (Likewise, a judicial authornym may stand for the work of 
the judge alone or the judge and one or more law clerks.) In any 
event, the unifying characteristic of all these statements of authorship 
is that the name situated in the position of "author" is primarily, if not 
solely, an attributional device: It is the name that has been chosen by 
the work's writer (or editor, or publisher, or other controller of the 
publication rights) as the name with which the work in question shall 
be associated in the minds of its readers, without regard to whether 
that name has any identity whatsoever with the name of the person or 
persons responsible for the various stages of the writing process.l 13 
The authornym, then, is the result of decoupling statements of 
authorship from the act of authorship. To reject this decoupling and 
say tq~t "Amanda Cross" was Carolyn Heilbrun because Carolyn Heil-
/d. 
112 See supra note 110; see also, e.g., Griffin, supra note 23, at 890. 
/d. 
We should not assume that the aesthetic identity of the author ... is a uni-
fied entity; rather it is split into multiple entities in the course of individual 
publications, whose nominal authors may have different names, and is col-
lected together under the name of the empirical writer only after the fact. 
113 My "authomym" is in some sense akin to Barthes's "modem scriptor": 
The [Romantic] Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past 
of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line di-
vided into a before and after . .. . [T] he modem scriptor is born simultane-
ously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or 
exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as predicate; there is 
no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written 
here and now. 
BARTHES, supra note 16, at 145; see also Griffin, supra note 23, at 890. 
Authors, in many cases, have had the option of selecting out of all the things 
they write and publish those which they will sign, and those which they will 
not sign or will issue under a pseudonym. In this situation, the author's 
name is another artifact, at a distance from the empirical writer and part of 
the semiotics of the text, even when the legal name is given. 
/d. (footnote omitted). 
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brun was the name of the individual who put pen to paper is to reject 
the specific and affirmative choice Professor Heilbrun made in writing 
under Amanda Cross's name, a choice that purposefully denied au-
thorship to "Carolyn Heilbrun." And even the reader who is aware 
that "Amanda Cross" and "Carolyn Heilbrun" coalesce in the same 
physical body will almost certainly continue to keep separate the vari-
ous reader reactions to the bodies of work of each of these 
authornyms. The fact that the author of the Amanda Cross mysteries 
was an English professor at Columbia University is likely to be re-
garded as a critical curiosity and not as a fact that informs (or, per-
haps, should inform) interpretation of either the mysteries or 
Professor Heilbrun's scholarly works. So, too, with "Mark Twain," 
"Carolyn Keene," and even 'john Grisham"-while speaking in the 
traditional terminology of Romantic authorship, each is only an at-
tributional device and understood by its relevant readership as such. 
In the online world, the use of screen names or other online identities 
to mediate communication is now wholly accepted, as is the idea that 
an online moniker might well bear no relation to the speaker's "true" 
identity.114 Like an offline statement of authorship, a screen name is 
an organizational label for the various online speech acts that to-
gether constitute one's online identity.115 Thus, the name of the au-
thor of a creative work is really a convenient shorthand, what Judge 
Posner has called a "functional rather than a natural designation";116 
it enables us to categorize other works attributed to that same author, 
but it is not designed to offer us any truth about the identity of the 
creator of the work. 
II. THE AUTHORNYM AS TRADEMARK 
The description offered in the previous Part of an attributional 
device used to label created product does not, of course, apply only to 
114 See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges 
to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE. LJ. 1639, 1640 (1995); Rob Kling et al., 
Assessing Anonymous Communication on the Internet: Policy Deliberations, 15 INFO. Soc'v 79 
(1999); Marx, supra note 59 (contrasting settings in which participants expect the use 
of pseudonyms with "other contexts of personal relations," in which "embedded 
'identity norms' about authenticity in personal interaction" are present) . 
115 Froomkin, supra note 59, par. 35 ("Most people we interact with online are just 
a name and an e-mail address, plus whatever impression we have formed of them by 
what they say."); Giordano, supra note 96, '1[ 14 ("An individual's online identity is 
thus the sum of when, where and how she speaks, and what she says."). 
116 PosNER, supra note 40, at 381 (noting that "the attribution of specific works to 
specific individuals as authors, with all the e thical, interpretive, and legal implications 
of tha t attribution, is . .. a cultural artifact"). 
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what I am calling authornyms. A trademark serves an identical pur-
pose: to convey a designation of source to consumers, even if the ac-
tual source of the product remains unknown to any particular 
consumer. In this Part, I briefly discuss the history of trademarks and 
their protection and consider how the authornym is, in fact, a literary 
trademark. I am aided in this endeavor by the work of postmodern 
literary theorists who, albeit not directly, describe the author in partic-
ularly trademark-like terms. 
A. Trademarks and Identity 
As others have well documented, 117 the trademark was originally 
a simple, and immediately correlative, statement of product creation. 
In a world in which goods were traded face to face, trademarks were 
unnecessary, as the buyer satisfied with a previous purchase could sim-
ply return to the seller of those goods to engage in further transac-
tions.118 Once the sphere of commerce expanded to the point at 
which face-to-face transactions became impractical, marks of origin-
typically identifying a single artisan-were placed on handmade arti-
facts, such as pottery, and served to identify to the consumer the indi-
vidual to whom complaints of shoddy handiwork could be directed.119 
As Benjamin Paster notes, the direct correlation between mark and 
artisan typically prohibited any multiplicity of identity: A master crafts-
man was required by his guild to "choose a mark ... to use it on all 
goods he produced, and to retain it his entire life."120 
Trademarks were not solely concerned with poor workmanship, 
however. Producers naturally wanted to encourage repeat purchases 
and needed a way of enabling consumers who might never meet the 
manufacturer in person to find the goods they desired. Trademarks 
facilitate the search of a repeat consumer; in today's parlance, they 
reduce the search costs for such a consumer by conveying information 
about the source of a product that is not otherwise easily ascertaina-
117 See, e.g., ScHECHTER, supra note 6, at 20-37; Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical 
Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975); Daniel M. McClure, Trade-
marks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305 
(1979); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 
551-52 (1969). 
118 Paster, supra note 117, at 551-52. 
119 In re Wood, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1345, 1348-49 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 
1983) ("Indeed, it is difficult to draw a distinction from the early marks of identifica-
tion of potters and other artisans used in connection with their artistic and commer-
cial products and an artist's name affixed to his or her work of art."); Paster, supra 
note 117, at 553. 
120 Paster, supra note 117, at 556. 
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ble. A consumer who is satisfied with the fit of Levi's jeans and wishes 
to buy another pair need not spend the day in the dressing room in 
search of a pair of jeans exhibiting the same qualities as the first pair; 
rather, she can rely on the Levi's trademark to direct her to a pair of 
jeans produced by the same manufacturer. The law grants protection 
to trademarks to ensure the reliability of these source indicators and, 
relatedly, to encourage companies to produce goods of consistent 
quality under a particular mark.121 
There is no longer any requirement, however, that producers 
limit themselves to a single mark. As Frank Schechter noted eighty 
years ago, " [ t] he modern manufacturer may use a mark or several 
marks or no mark just as he pleases. "122 Producers are now free to 
invent marks that differ from their cmporate names and to devise dif-
ferent marks for different products. So long as each mark is corre-
lated with a single producer in a way that is not confusing to the 
relevant consumer market, the mark need not reflect that producer's 
corporate name.123 In trademark law, this is known as the "anony-
mous source" doctrine, by which we mean that as long as a consumer 
understands a trademark to convey that the same producer is behind 
a particular product each time the mark is used in connection with 
that product, the consumer need not be able to name that producer. 
To take a modern example, trademarks allow the company now 
known as Altria to market cigarettes under the brand Marlboro and to 
market macaroni-and-cheese mix under the brand Kraft. It need not 
121 Of course, the "source" that is indicated by a trademark is today probably more 
theoretical than actual, as the actual manufacturer of a particular good may not be 
the one suggested by the mark. See, e.g., James Brooke, Factory jobs Move Overseas as 
japan's Troubles Deepen, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at AI (quoting the chief economist 
for Merrill Lynch Japan, who referred to the "Nike model," in which "you do the 
brand management in Seattle and the manufacturing in Indonesia"). 
122 SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 122. As Schechter points out, some courts were 
slow to recognize this modem development in trademark law. See id. at 147; see also 
Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439, 457 (1870). 
!d. 
A trade mark denotes the origin of the article. No one man can have more 
than one mark or brand .. . . If the owner could have more than one mark 
by which to distinguish his property, great confusion and uncertainty would 
be produced, to such an extent as to defeat the object in view. 
123 This requirement is typically stated as requiring that the trademark "identify" a 
single source. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 
(1995). But a mark that is not textually equivalent to a producer's corporate name 
does not "identify" the producer in the way tha t we usually use the word. The mark 
DORITOS, for example, does not "identify" Frito-Lay, Inc. , but it is uniquely corre-
lated with that company. It is more accurate, therefore, to say that trademarks "distin-
guish" sources, rather than "identify" them. See id. at 164. 
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use the name Altria for any of its products, and it need not choose a 
trademark that directly informs consumers that Altria is the source of 
any particular product.1 24 
Thus, whereas the trademark once served to inform the con-
sumer of the name of the producer, the modern trademark serves as a 
form of identity creation. The goal of the modern trademark is the 
same-reduction of consumer search costs-but the method has 
changed. There need no longer be an obvious genealogical line be-
tween the name of the mark and the name of the producer; rather, 
the producer can create as many corporate identities as it has prod-
ucts and name them as it wishes.I 25 A producer might choose this 
multiplicity of identity to avoid spreading a brand too thin or for more 
strategic reasons, such as to obfuscate the fact that two different types 
of products share a common source. The modern trademark thus not 
only enables producers to associate some products with one set of 
meanings by grouping them under a single brand and thereby to dis-
associate others, but also enables consumers to more easily channel 
their goodwill toward particular products from a particular producer 
without being required to allow that goodwill to spill over to others of 
that producer's products. 126 To the consumer who takes trademarks 
at face value, "Marlboro" is a separate identity from "Kraft"; "Altria" is 
a reinvention of the former "Phillip Morris."127 Consumers who want 
to maintain the identity fiction that trademarks enable can thereby 
safely buy Altria's macaroni-and-cheese mix while they disdain Altria's 
cigarettes. 
124 Indeed, "companies have an incentive to maintain the value of their brands, 
and in a competitive market they are unlikely to expand the reach of a single trade-
mark so far that consumers are confused rather than enlightened by the use of the 
brand name." Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2, at 800. 
125 Provided, of course, that the name does not infringe another's trademark or is 
not otherwise unlawful. 
126 In this sense, a mark is a repository for consumer goodwill. See, e.g., Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982) ("By applying a trademark 
to goods produced by one other than the trademark's owner, the infringer deprives 
the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain." (citing 
S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946))). 
127 For Altria's own take on its corporate identity, see Altria, Inc., Corporate Identity, 
at http:/ /www.altria.com/about_altria/01_01_corpidenchange.asp (last visited Feb. 
12, 2005) ("By changing its name, Altria Group will clarify its identity as to what it is: a 
parent company to both tobacco and food companies that manage some of the 
world's most successful brands."). 
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B. The A uthornym as Commercial Trademark 
As suggested earlier in this Article, authornyms, like trademarks, 
serve the goal of reducing consumer search costs while also facilitating 
identity creation. The reader who enjoyed her first John Grisham 
novel and would like to purchase more from the same author need 
not spend the day in her local bookstore poring over books to find 
ones with the same qualities as the first book. As with her Levi's, she 
can simply look for the name 'john Grisham" on the cover of the 
book and trust that the source of this text is the same as the source of 
the novel she has already read.128 This is why particularly famous 
authornyms are used as promotional tags, often appearing in larger 
type on the cover than does the title. 
The search-facilitating function of an authornym, like that of a 
trademark, comes about largely because of the authornym's ability to 
serve as a repository of goodwill. The authornym acts as a signal to 
the reader to associate particular bodies of work with a particular 
brand, both in terms of future purchases ("this is another John 
Grisham novel") and in terms of accretion of quality ("this John 
Grisham novel will be of the same quality as his previous one").I 29 
The "Richard Posner" brand likewise identifies certain judicial opin-
ions as emanating from a single source/ author (even if to some small 
degree corporate) and serves as a shorthand for identifying (and en-
couraging) the quality of the product under that mark. An author 
who wants to segregate these symbols of goodwill will engage in one-
to-many authornymous writing. Just as Altria can, by its selection of 
different brand names, keep the Marlboro goodwill and the Kraft 
goodwill separate, the author can, by her selection of different 
128 Like Levi's, the authomym ':John Grisham" may be used for a variety of differ-
ent products within a single genre. The fact that the product for which the consumer 
searches may not be identical to the one previously purchased (low-cut jeans instead 
of baggy, The Pelican Brief rather than The Firm) does not reduce the source-distin-
guishing value of either mark. 
129 See Kreimer, supra note 58, at 85. 
!d. 
In one dimension, the identity of a speaker is a proxy for previous communi-
cations. [The astronomer Carl] Sagan could preface each remark with an 
account of his entire previous corpus, but, even in an academic seminar, it 
seems simpler just to sign his name. Conversely, identification makes other 
communications available to listeners. When evaluating an argument of 
Richard Posner regarding 'efficiency,' it is useful to be able to refer to his 
other work. 
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authornyms, keep her scholarly goodwill and her fiction goodwill sep-
arate, creating different currencies of intellectual capital in each. 130 
This streamlining of search through symbol does not require di-
rect identification of the producer. The anonymous source doctrine 
works just as well for authornyms as it does for trademarks. It is not 
necessary for a consumer to know that Kimberly-Clark makes "Bug-
gies" to evaluate the worth of the diapers and associate them with the 
brand; similarly, it is not necessary for a reader to know that Amanda 
Cross mysteries were written by a Columbia humanities professor in 
order to enjoy the writing (indeed, they may well prefer not to know), 
or to know that "Dear Abby" is now written by Abigail Van Buren's 
daughter to trust in her advice (although her daughter would proba-
bly be well-advised not to depart from the stylistic characteristics read-
ers have come to associate with the mark). So too online: Because 
authornymity is one of the organizing principles of Internet commu-
nication, the creation of intellectual capital associated with an online 
pseudonym is particularly important. But it need not be necessary-
indeed, it probably happens fairly infrequently-that the reader 
knows the "true" identity behind any particular pseudonym. In other 
words, an online participant doesn't have to know that "Business-
Guy@aol.com" is actually John Smith of Akron, Ohio, in order to eval-
uate the worth of his message board postings and to accord the 
appropriate amount of trust to future postings based on the worth of 
his past comments.l31 
130 See, e.g., Post, supra note 59, at 142 ("Pseudonymous speech is valuable in a way 
that anonymous speech is not and cannot be, because it permits the accumulation of 
reputational capital and 'goodwill' over time in the pseudonym itself, while simultane-
ously serving as a liability limitation insulating the speaker's 'true identity' from 
exposure."). 
131 Some screen names and domain names-like some trademarks-tell us at the 
very least where in cyberspace the owner of that name "lives." For example, from 
"BusinessGuy@aol.com," we know that this speaker "lives" at aol.com-that is, he is a 
subscriber to America Online's service-and from www.genericlawschool.edu, we 
know that whatever "Generic Law School" is, it is most likely an educational institu-
tion, because it resides in the .edu top-level domain (TLD). The second level domain 
(and probably the TLD as well) is often interpreted in a trademark sense in that 
certain reputation-enhancing (or reputation-detracting) characteristics are associated 
with it. See, e.g., Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, in 16 AD-
VANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 99, 107-11 (EJ. Lawler et al. eds., 1999); Tamarah 
Belczyk, Note, Domain Names: The Special Case of Personal Names, 82 B.U. L. REv. 485, 
490 (2002) . And in one recent instance, the personal (trademark) is political: Wit-
ness the employee of the animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals who had her name legally changed to the URL for PET A's website, 
GoVeg.com. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Hello. My Name Is . .. 
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This concept of the authornym as trademark may not be fully 
developed in legal doctrine 132 or legal scholarship,133 but it is one that 
literary critics have recognized, in various forms, for some time-per-
haps not surprising given the received story that "authorship" was 
birthed from a desire for commercialization. Mark Rose, for example, 
has noted that the "author-work relation" is "institutionalized in our 
system of marketing cultural products," in which the name of the au-
GoVeg.com.', at http:/ /www.goveg.com/feat/l-govegname.html (last visited Feb. 12, 
2005). 
One aspect that distinguishes online trademarks such as screen names and do-
main names is their strong functional aspect, quite separate from their source- or 
quality-indicating aspect. In other words, the screen name "boysrch" not only served 
as a way for Timothy McVeigh to express a particular personality, it also functioned 
quite simply as an address-as a way for correspondents to reach him (via 
boysrch@aol.com). There are, of course, analogues in the offiine world: "30 Rocke-
feller Plaza" is not only an address, but is well known as the headquarters for NBC; 
"1600 Pennsylvania Avenue" is not only the location of the U.S. President's home, but 
is also shorthand for the governmental Office of the White House. And yet the trade-
mark quality of an e-mail address is undoubtedly the reason why users are much more 
loath to give up a particular screen name than they are a telephone number or street 
address. 
132 See, e.g., In re Michael S. Sachs, Inc. v. Cordon Art B.V., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1132 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2000); In re Wood, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1345, 
1348-49 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1983) (noting that the name of an artist on a 
work of art "serves a trademark function in that it identifies the source of the product 
and distinguishes it from the goods of another ... [as well as] denotes consistency of 
the quality of the goods sold under the mark"); Ex Parte Grandma Moses Props., Inc., 
117 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 366 (Comm'r Patents & Trademarks 1958) (noting that 
"Grandma Moses" functioned as a mark for fabric created in the style of her paint-
ings). But see In reChicago Reader Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079, 1080 (Trademark 
Tr. & App. Bd. 1989) ("A nom de plume or pseudonym of a writer is not generally 
regarded as a trademark for the writing."). In general, the courts have accorded a 
personal name trademark status only upon a finding of secondary meaning. Once a 
personal name acquires trademark status, the likelihood of confusion analysis is the 
same as it would be for any other trademark. See, e.g. , Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 
F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2004); Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989 (7th 
Cir. 2004); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1288 (9th Cir. 
1992); 2 j. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§§ 13:2, 13:12 (4th ed. 2004). 
133 Jaszi & Woodmansee, supra note 15, at 8. This is not to say that legal scholars 
have been completely absent from this debate; the work of scholars such as Peter 
Jaszi, David Lange, and james Boyle, among others, has been seminal. See, e.g., BoYLE, 
supra note 15; Boyle, The Search for an Author, supra note 14, at 625-27; Jaszi, supra 
note 23, at 456; Lange, supra note 17, at 139. The idea also hovers in some of the 
more doctrinal literature. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 117, at 289; Edward S. Rog-
ers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAw. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
173, 173-74 (1949) (equating the identification functions of trademarks and personal 
names). 
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thor "becomes a kind of brand name, a recognizable sign that the 
cultural commodity will be of a certain kind and quality." 134 Gerard 
Genette has described the effect the choice of a particular authornym 
has on a reader and how the typical reader can quite easily keep the 
writer's authomym distinct from the writer's legal name as well as the 
images and reactions associated with each. 135 (To take a familiar ex-
ample, most readers continue to refer to the author of The Adventures 
of Tom Sawyer as "Mark Twain" long after learning that the author's 
legal name is Samuel L. Clemens; the same holds true for "Lewis Car-
roll" and "Charles L. Dodgson," and for many other similar pairs.) 
Margaret Ezell, to take a third example, cites various examples of sev-
enteenth-century titles ("Six familiar essays upon marriage, crosses in love, 
sickness, death, loyalty, and friendship, written by a lady" ( 1696)), which, in 
their obvious prolixity, function as "a promotional advertisement for 
the volume," an advertisement that typically includes a consistent 
authomym)("by a lady") as part of the advertisement.136 
C. The Authornym as Literary Trademark 
The traditional economic justification for trademark protec-
tion-to reduce consumers' search costs-means that the value of a 
trademark lies in its commerciality. The "search" that we talk about is 
one that is usually assumed to end with a purchase, a choice between 
alternatives that is made easier by the information a trademark con-
veys. But not every search guided by trademarks is commercial in the 
sense that money flows from the consumer to (ultimately) the pro-
ducer. The "post-sale confusion" cases are one example, in which the 
confused consumer is not the purchaser of the product but some 
third person who sees the misbranded product and thereby forms an 
opinion of the brand that may or may not guide future purchases.137 
The merchandising cases are another example, where the value of the 
trademark is in the mark itself, not in the article of clothing to which 
it is attached.138 Cybersquatting cases are yet another example, where 
134 RosE, supra note 13, at 1. Publishers' names have also historically served this 
function. See, e.g., Woodmansee, supra note 23, at 441. 
135 GENETrE, supra note 20, at 50. 
136 Ezell, supra note 63, at 72; cf Griffin, supra note 23, at 880 (describing a similar 
role for the phrase "by the author of'). "By a lady" is in one sense a one-to-many 
authornym in that it enabled male writers to write in the feminine voice, and in an-
other sense a corporate authornym in that it was shared by many writers over time, 
each aspiring to a typical "feminine" style. 
137 See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy's, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2003). 
138 The most well-known of these cases is probably Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n 
v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, 510 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1975) . 
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the use of a mark is deemed confusing not because it causes consum-
ers to purchase a product they didn't intend to buy, but because it 
causes web page viewers to associate a particular viewpoint with the 
trademark holder.139 In these types of cases, trademark infringement 
occurs (say the courts) not because the defendant is selling goods mis-
branded with the plaintiff's trademark, but because the defendant is 
misattributing a concept (the quality of the post-sale good, the author-
ization to sell the logo-emblazoned T-shirt, the content of the website) 
to the plaintiff via use of the plaintiff's mark. Under this theory, the 
trademark serves not as indication of source of goods so much as it 
does an indication of sponsorship or authorization. 
The authornym serves this function as well. The use of an au-
thor's name to brand a particular piece of writing-or, conversely, the 
attribution of a particular piece of writing to a particular author's 
name-is a mark of authorization. To say that 'John Grisham is the 
author of this work" is not only to say, "This work emanates from the 
same source as the lastjohn Grisham work," but is also to say, "This is 
an authorized john Grisham work." The former statement allows con-
sumers in the economic marketplace to find desired goods more eas-
ily; the latter statement allows consumers in the marketplace of ideas 
to build coherent interpretive structures. This reduction of interpre-
tive costs is what allows "Carolyn Heilbrun" to write simultaneously 
and yet separately from "Amanda Cross," and why both readers and 
the law permit her to do so. 
Here, again, the literary theorists presage this development. It 
was Barthes, as I described earlier, who formalized the concept of the 
"death of the author," under which the author has no claim to pri-
macy in the interpretation of the work but rather must contend with 
the interpretation each reader brings. The "death of the author" de-
scribes not only the state of authorship under U.S. copyright law, 
where the individual or entity deemed the "author" need not be the 
creative source of the text, but also the state of authorship under U.S. 
trademark law, where the anonymous source doctrine pushes the au-
thor/producer to the background and focuses attention on the 
authornym/brand. For example, as the Seventh Circuit famously 
noted in 1904, the trademark "Baker" used in connection with choco-
late products could be maintained even though the court could 
"safely take it for granted that not one in a thousand knowing of or 
desiring to purchase 'Baker's Cocoa' or 'Baker's Chocolate' know of 
139 See, e.g. , People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 
359, 362 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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Walter Baker & Co., Limited." 140 The anonymous source ts l'auteur 
mort. 
But the death of the author does not require the death of the 
authornym. As discussed earlier, Michel Foucault, in What Is an Au-
thor?,l41 picked up where Barthes left off in describing how an au-
thor's name "performs a certain role with regard to narrative 
discourse, assuring a classificatory function" that "permits one to 
group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate 
them from and contrast them to others"142-the very work of trade-
marks.143 To Foucault, an authornym's meaning comes not from bi-
140 Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 F. 514, 518 (7th Cir. 1904); see also Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1963) . 
Of course there may not be one in a hundred buyers of this whisky who 
knows that it is made by Buchanan or wholesaled by Fleischmann. Probably 
an that such buyers know is that Black & White Scotch whisky has satisfied 
them in the past or that they have heard of it .... It is not material whether 
he would think that the makers of the Scotch whisky were actually brewing 
and bottling this beer, or whether it was being produced under their supervi-
sion or pursuant to some other arrangement with them. He would probably 
not concern himself about any such detail. 
/d.; 1 McCARTHY, supra note 132, §§ 3:7, 3:9; Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of 
Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 814-15 (1927). 
141 Foucault, supra note 23, at 141-60. 
142 /d. at 147; see also Chartier, supra note 20, at 10; Hazlitt, supra note 95, at 351 
(describing the "practically indispensable advantage of the signature" as allowing 
readers "to view any artist's work as a unit"); cf Foster, supra note 91, at 375 (describ-
ing skeptically how through "well-worn" "Foucauldian goggles" the "literary landscape 
from smallest shrub to mightiest oak looks more or less the same" and "[t]he particu-
lar name by which each plant is called hardly matters-except, of course, as a signifier 
of relative market value"). 
143 Robert Griffin makes this point more fully: 
[T] he relation of filiation between texts obtains even when the author is a 
fiction. More than that, filiation exists even when the author remains un-
known, as in the example of texts that are signed "by the author of." .. . The 
phrase "by the author of," it should be noted, refers us not so much to a 
situated person as to a previous performance and acts as a kind of advertise-
ment .... In these cases, a relation is established between two texts accord-
ing to their authorship and yet the author remains nameless. In fact, a book 
can have several of the characteristics of the author-function as Foucault de-
fines it-status, copyright, relation to other books by the same author, and 
so on-and yet not have a named author. This is because the author-func-
tion describes precisely a function that may be fulfil1ed by a name but does 
not require one. It is first of an an empty function, a structural blank space, 
which may be signed or unsigned depending on the circumstances. And 
when signed, of course, the name may just as easily be a pseudonym . ... The 
author's name is another artifact, at a distance from the empirical writer, a 
signifier within the semiotics of the text that can be manipulated strategi-
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ography but from the reader, who brings to the text certain cultural 
assumptions and a reader's history, but does not bring, except in the 
very rarest of circumstances, knowledge of the author that derives 
from anything other than a textual relationship. 144 Although Fou-
cault's essay focused on what he termed the "author function," it 
might alternatively have focused on what one commentator has called 
the "attribution function" 145 (or, here, an "authomym"). If Barthes 
called for the disappearance of the author, Foucault restores a limited 
"author function" that-while not promoting a biographical or inten-
tional approach to interpretation-acknowledges the legal and inter-
pretive utility that authors' names serve.146 This is not a system in 
which meaning cannot accumulate (indeed, it accumulates in the 
authornym itself, the main value of which is as a repository for mean-
ing), but is one in which authorial biography rests in no position of 
preeminence. Like a trademark, an authornym need only describe a 
particular, and singular, claim to authorship-whether individual or 
corporate. So long as the fan of Grisham's novels can identify those 
novels branded with Grisham's authornym and distinguish them from 
others, he need not know any details of Grisham's "true" identity-
indeed, 'john Grisham" can be female or a nonlawyer or a collective 
cally .... Signing one's legal name is not an automatic choice, but part of a 
strategy for associating only certain pieces with a projected persona. 
Griffin, supra note 93, at 9-10; see also DuRING, supra note 13, at 123 ("(For Foucault,] 
the concept 'author' is a means of grouping and valuing writing: 'Homer' or 'Hip-
pocrates' are authors despite doubts as to their actual existence."); Griffin, supra note 
23, at 882 (describing how an author's name "operates in discourse independently of 
its possible reference to an empirical person"). 
144 See, e.g., Lanser, supra note 65, at 83-84, 97 (noting that authorship is "inferred 
continuously and mostly subliminally as a reader processes a text") . Lanser refers to 
both the Danny Santiago and the Forrest Carter episodes, discussed supra notes 70-73 
and accompanying text, as examples of "the potential gap between real and implied 
authorship" that exploits the reader's expectation of authorship derived from the 
text. Lanser, supra note 65, at 84. 
145 Foster, supra note 91, at 377 (calling "the attribution function" the "practice of 
assigning a name, initials, or pseudonym to a circulated text"). 
146 See, e.g., Pease, supra note 16, at 113. 
/d. 
[In Foucault's view,] (c]ritical language (its vocabulary of accusation, de-
fense,judgment) depends on the legal system (and the cultural systems affil-
iated with it) for its warrant . ... The name of the author turns discourse into 
legal property, and the notion of legal property in tum supports and is sup-
poned by related discourses concerning entitlements, liberties, duties, 
rights, constraints, impediments, obligations, and punishment. ... (T]he 
name of the author turns otherwise unrelated discursive practices into a co-
herent cultural realm over which it maintains jurisdiction. 
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authorial endeavor so long as the authornym allows the reader I con-
sumer to locate both the work and his responses to it. 
Trademark law reinforces this view not only by pushing the true 
identity of the source to the background in favor of the trademark, 
but also by largely devaluing the source's intent as a guide to trade-
mark meaning. While it is certainly true that a producer intends to 
convey a certain meaning when it selects a trademark for a particular 
good or service, the producer cannot prevail in a challenge to a 
mark's status simply by claiming primacy for its intended meaning. 
Courts do not, for example, inquire as to the company's motivation in 
selecting a particular trademark or give probative weight to testimony 
on what the creator intended to convey by the choice of one word 
over another. 147 Rather, courts act as readers, deriving an interpreta-
tion that makes the best sense to them and then imposing that inter-
pretation on the text of the trademark. 
In short, a trademark has no meaning on its own. Whatever 
meaning it does have takes its cues not from authorial intent or biog-
raphy but rather from the context in which it sits and the interpreta-
tion of that mark in context by consumers.148 The meaning of any 
trademark depends not on the intent of its creator-although the cre-
ator may attempt to guide meaning through investment, both creative 
147 See, e.g., Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. MaiV)'l Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 
1332 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[D]esires or intentions of the creator . .. are irrelevant. In-
stead, it is the attitude of the consumer that is important."); Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. 
Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("[R]egardless of [the mark 
owner's] intentions, it is the association, by the consumer, of the ... design with [the 
mark owner] as the source that is determinative."); Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imps., 
508 F.2d 824, 827 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (holding that in determining distinctiveness, "it is 
the association of the mark with a particular source by the ultimate consumers which 
is to be measured-not [the applicant's] intent" in adopting the mark) . The likeli-
hood-of-confusion test operates in a similar fashion when courts turn to such evidence 
as consumer surveys, which merely represent the collective "readers' " interpretation 
of the mark, rather than to any authorial view of the mark's meaning. Cf Steven Wilf, 
Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. LJ. 1, 10 (1999) ("[T]he public 
forms an interpretive community whose reading of trademark symbolism casts it in 
the role of creating authorial-like meanings about the mark itself.") . 
148 CooMBE, supra note 53, at 8; cJ. Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trade-
mark Law, 103 MrcH. L. REv. (forthcoming Aug. 2005) ("Trademarks exist only to the 
extent that consumers perceive them as designations of source. Infringement occurs 
only to the extent that consumers perceive one trademark as referring to the source 
of another. The most 'intellectual' of the intellectual properties, trademarks are a 
property purely of consumers' minds."); Foster, supra note 91 , at 394 ("Though mod-
em writers in a free society ... can choose how and indeed whether to attribute their 
own work, it remains the critic's prerogative, not the author's, to determine the mean-
ing of an attribution."). 
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and financial, in the mark-but on the collective "multiple writings, 
drawn from many cultures" that Barthes describes as central to literary 
interpretation. 
I do not intend by this to dismiss out of hand the response that 
there are reasons we might want to limit the reach of the "anonymous 
source" theory in literary interpretation-that it is, in fact, important 
to know the source of a piece of written work in order to evaluate its 
true merit. 149 This may be particularly true when the chosen 
authornym suggests a racial, gendered, or ethnic claim to the text. 150 
We may not much care if, for example, the mystery author "Amanda 
Cross" turns out to be a professor at Columbia University, but we do 
care when the young Latino author "Danny Santiago" is revealed to be 
a white man in his seventies or when Native American author "Forrest 
Carter" turns out to be a white supremacist because the value of these 
texts seems to depend in great measure on their "authenticity."151 
149 See, e.g., Foster, supra note 91, at 376 ("[O}ne cannot safely construct a reading 
of the elegy without a coherent, relatively stable, and widely shared notion of the 
'W.S.' whose 'I' is referenced on the title-page and dedication, as well as in the first-
person text." (describing the contested authorship of "W.S.'"s February 1612 Funerall 
Elegye) ); id. at 382 (describing the outrage of early-eighteenth-century subscribers to 
Alexander Pope's translation of Homer's Odyssey when they discovered that two previ-
ously unnamed individuals had collaborated with Pope); Mark A. Lemley, Rights of 
Attribution and Integrity in Online Communications, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 2, par. 30, at 
http:/ /www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/lemley.html. 
!d. 
The implications of online impersonation are quite troubling. In a context 
where communication is still largely verbal, readers have very few cues to the 
identity or intention of the author of the message except what the author 
actually posts. If authorial claims of identity are readily hackable and thus 
untrustworthy, all the social and legal rules that depend on identity-liability 
for defamation or copyright infringement, the effectiveness of flaming or 
other forms of social sanctions, etc.-are thrown into doubt. 
150 BROWDER, supra note 66, at 3 (noting that the ethnic autobiography "[has} 
traditionally been written and read as a means of helping frame the complex cultural 
relationships of a multiethnic society"). 
151 See, e.g., Foster, supra note 91, at 384-85 (suggesting that whether the author of 
a feminist text is a woman or "a male polemicist who's having a hoot passing himself 
off as a discontented woman" does indeed "affect the meaning and valuation of the 
text"); id. at 391-92 (suggesting by adopting the pseudonym "Ka-Tzetnik" in writing 
his Holocaust memoir, the writer Yehiel Feiner "tainted his work with the stigma of 
fictionalization"); id. at 394 (contending that, particularly when the text is part of a 
racial discourse, knowing when a text is "an exercise in literary artifice" is important). 
For his part, Daniel James, the alter ego of "Danny Santiago," offered the following 
response when asked if he thought he had participated in a hoax: "He shrugged and 
said the book itself was the only answer. If the book were good, it was good under 
whatever identity the author chose to use ... . " Dunne, supra note 73, at 27. Gilbert 
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The same is true with trademarks: A consumer may wish to know that 
the same corporation that makes Kraft macaroni and cheese also 
makes Marlboro cigarettes in order to make a decision about where 
her food budget is spent. Thus, the argument goes, there is a signifi-
cant cost to this kind of experimentation in that it leads readers to 
assume a greater degree of distrust in identity and reliability than is 
socially beneficial in community discourse. 152 
Postmodernists would suggest that this concern is inappropri-
ate-that the writing or the product should rise or fall on its own mer-
its, regardless of the intentions, motivations, or characteristics of its 
source. And there is a risk that in unmasking an authornym, we pre-
vent ourselves from making these sorts of unbiased judgments-pre-
cisely the reason why many creators adopt an authornym in the first 
place.153 The fact that a newly discovered text thought to be authored 
by Shakespeare would be regarded differently if its authorial lineage 
could be confirmed does not undermine a postmodern view of inter-
pretation; rather, the revelation's value is in the ability to add this text 
to the others attributed to the Shakespearean authornym and evaluate 
Larochelle provides a stark literary example along these same lines: "For example, 
had Mein Kampfbeen written by Mother Teresa, rather than Adolf Hitler, the reading 
of the work would change radically, indeed it would command a closer look at the 
historical data that could help clarify its meaning." Gilbert Larochelle, From Kant to 
Foucault: VVhat Remains of the Author in Postmodernism, in PERSPEGriVES ON PlAGIARISM 
AND INTEU.EcruAL PROPERTY IN A PosTMODERN WoRLD, supra note 18, at 121, 129. 
152 See Levmore, supra note 64, at 2208-09. 
/d. 
The author's defense [to the use of pseudonymity] is that a reader's biases 
are exposed by the deception, but inasmuch as that is true of many success-
ful deceptions it seems fair to conclude that the cost of deception, in terms 
of reducing the signal of (aH) authorship, is perceived to exceed the gain 
from testing the value of these signals with false signals. 
153 See, e.g., LESSING, supra note 94, at vii (stating that she did not want readers' 
judgment of the work to be tainted with judgments derived from reading of works of 
"Doris Lessing"); Cromartie, supra note 94 (reporting an interview with Joe Klein, 
author of Primary Colors). 
"But [the anonymity] was necessary. People who have reviewed the book 
have since said to me, 'If I had known it was you, I never could have reviewed 
it that way.' I wanted the book to have a clean read, to be judged on its own 
merits without any baggage." 
/d. (quoting Klein); Tien, supra note 58, at 145. 
/d. 
[T]he very utility of reputation as a proxy for judgment also carries costs for 
speech in the form of bias. If we know that a statement comes from an 
esteemed scholar, we may overvalue it for that reason and suspend our criti-
cal faculties. Conversely, if we know the statement is by a person we don't 
like, we may ignore it despite its value. 
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it against other such texts. i 54 Finally, given the common experience 
of ghostwriters and other corporate writing endeavors, and licensing 
and outsourced production, it's unclear what value the "identity" of 
the creator contributes to interpretation or evaluation in any event. 
Does it help, for example, to know the "true" identity of a pseudony-
mous writer if he is not actually the person responsible for putting 
pen to paper, or the identity of a corporate trademark owner whose 
products are made by an overseas assembly line managed by a foreign 
corporation?155 
But none of this should obscure the fact that the anonymous 
source doctrine simply says we need not know the identity of the 
"source," not that we are barred from endeavoring to discover it. 
'John Grisham" is a brand whether or not we know his biography, and 
we could ultimately assign that same biography to 'John Smith" in-
stead. In fact, for readers/ consumers who care about source, preser-
vation of authors' branding choices reinforces this consumer 
preference. The fact that the initial choice of authomym-like all 
brands-may not be particularly illuminating should be of no mo-
ment. Indeed, as noted earlier, consumers of cultural commodities in 
the modern era are familiar with the indeterminacy of authorship. 
They are conversant in the taxonomy of pen names and stage names; 
they know the President hasn't written every word of his speeches; 
they understand how it is possible that "Abigail Van Buren" still pens 
"Dear Abby" long after Pauline Phillips has put down her pen.156 In 
the same way that books like Famous All Over Town "teach [ ] us [the] 
154 Although I suspect he derives a different conclusion, Sean Burke states likewise 
when he writes: 
The discovery of a text like Freud's "Project for a Scientific Psychology" will 
modify psychoanalysis if and only if it is a text by Freud. Over and above the 
text's contents, the. fact of attribution-in and of itself-is the primary factor 
in establishing its significance for the psychoanalytic field. 
BuRKE, supra note 36, at 93; see also Foucault, supra note 23, at 157 n.3. Contrary to 
Burke's implication, there is no disjuncture between according a newly discovered 
text significance because it can authoritatively be attributed to Freud and maintaining 
that-as with the works already reposited in the Freudian canon-the addition of this 
new work does not provide newly discovered justification for retreating to authorial 
intention in interpretation; it merely reconfirms that texts are interpreted against 
other texts. 
155 Judge Posner raises the same point with respect to judges and their law clerks: 
"For judges active in the modern era of ghostwriting by law clerks, an attempt must be 
made to separate the judge's work from that of his ghosts; the polite ·fiction that all 
judges are the authors of all their opinions must be dropped, certainly for purposes of 
scholarly analysis." PosNER, supra note 40, at 377. 
156 See Wilson, supra note 102. 
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futility" of reading ethnic autobiography "to find out the definitive 
truth of a group's experience,"157 the Internet has rendered readers 
more distrustful of claims to authorship-perhaps even in an interpre-
tatively beneficial way-in that it has not only conditioned readers to 
accept screen names and the like as statements of authorship but also 
typically provided avenues (i.e., hyperlinks) through which the claims 
being made can be evaluated.158 
Those who would still claim that this kind of brand/identity crea-
tion is inherently fraudulent need only look to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. 159 Although the deci-
sion ultimately stands for the First Amendment right against com-
pelled self-identification-the right, in certain circumstances, to speak 
anonymously-the case is at its core an authornymity case rather than 
an anonymity case, standing not simply for the right to refrain from 
any statement of authorship at all but, more important, for the right 
to prefer one statement of authorship over another. 
The case involved Margaret Mcintyre, who distributed leaflets op-
posing a proposed school tax levy in the town of Westerville, Ohio. 
Some of her leaflets identified her as the author; others carried the 
pseudonym "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers."160 The Assistant Su-
perintendent of Elementary Education in the school district saw Mrs. 
Mcintyre distributing her leaflets, and five months after the levy's pas-
sage, he filed a complaint and affidavit with the Ohio Elections Com-
mission, alleging that Mrs. Mcintyre had violated an Ohio state statute 
prohibiting any person from, among other things, writing or distribut-
ing "any ... form of general publication" that was designed to "pro-
mote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in 
any election" unless the name and address of the author were listed 
on the publication.161 The Court ultimately found such a ban to be 
unconstitutional. 
The Court's justification for so concluding was more literary than 
instrumental. After tracing the pseudonymous history of the authors 
of the Federalist Papers, Mark Twain, and 0. Henry, the Court con-
cluded that, rather than occupying a special interpretive position, the 
identity of the author is "no different from other components of the 
157 BROWDER, supra note 66, at 269. 
158 Donald Foster further suggests that the anonymous writing standard on the 
Internet tends to devalue the need for "writer-recognition" and heighten the value in 
"eyeballs engaged." Foster, supra note 91, at 385. 
159 514 u.s. 334 (1995) . 
160 Id. at 337. 
161 Id. at 338 & n.3 (quoting OHIO REv. ConE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 
1988)). 
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document's content that the author is free to include or exclude."162 
The Court was unconcerned with the author's motivation for choos-
ing pseudonymity-although it could conceive of a number of reasons 
for so doing-noting that whatever the author's motivation, "at least 
in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous 
works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any 
public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry."163 
As the Court acknowledged, the content of a pseudonymously au-
thored publication could violate the law-by, for example, including 
libelous material or fraudulently misleading the public. It was for this 
reason that Ohio had argued that author identification was necessary 
to enable readers to evaluate the worth of the statement being 
made. 164 One might therefore argue, as Justice Scalia suggested in 
dissent, that a disclosure requirement would aid in identification of 
the alleged malfeasants so that appropriate corrective measures could 
be enforced. 165 But the majority seemed unconcerned by this prose-
cution problem, noting that "the absence of the author's name on a 
162 !d. at 348; see also id. at 342 ("Accordingly, an author's decision to remain 
anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of 
a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment."). 
163 !d. at 342. While the Court confined this sweeping statement to "the field of 
literary endeavor," it thereafter noted that the "freedom to publish anonymously ex-
tends beyond the literary realm" and that both types of authors could be motivated by 
the desire to disassociate any bias attributable to their true identity. See id. ("Anonym-
ity thereby provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that 
readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its 
proponent."). 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, took issue with the majority's implicit assertion that 
greater truth would result where a publication was required to stand or fall on its 
content alone. 
I am sure, however, that (1) a person who is required to put his name to a 
document is much less likely to lie than one who can lie anonymously, and 
(2) the distributor of a leaflet which is unlawful because it is anonymous 
runs much more risk of immediate detection and punishment than the dis-
tributor of a leaflet which is unlawful because it is false. Thus, people will be 
more likely to observe a signing requirement than a naked "no falsity" re-
quirement; and, having observed that requirement, will then be significantly 
less likely to lie in what they have signed. 
!d. at 382 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
164 Id. at 343-44. 
165 Id. at 385 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("[Anonymity] facilitates wrong by eliminating 
accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymity."). Justice Clark 
took a similar view in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 71 (1960) (Clark,]., dissenting) 
("All that Los Angeles requires is that one who exercises his right of free speech 
through writing or distributing handbills identify himself just as does one who speaks 
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document does not necessarily protect either that person or a distrib-
utor of a forbidden document from being held responsible for com-
pliance with the Election Code"166-suggesting, in essence, that the 
"identification" of an author on a particular piece of writing is simply 
text, no more true than not true as to the identity of the true "author." 
Granted, the Mcintyre Court's indifference to authorial identity 
cannot be taken at pure face value. If, as the Mcintyre Court says, 
one's identity truly is "no different from other components of the doc-
ument's content that the author is free to include or exclude," it 
would be difficult to imagine many circumstances in which the gov-
ernment, via subpoena or otherwise, could compel disclosure of iden-
tity, for the First Amendment "is deeply hostile to content-based 
regulation."167 Similarly, it seems difficult to reconcile the Mcintyre 
Court's broad approval of authornymous speech with its conciliatory 
approach, in other cases, to governmental regulation of false 
speech, 168 which the statement "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers" 
technically is. 
And yet we can take from the case the choice that the Court's 
decision preserved, even elevated to constitutional status: a choice, 
not about an omission of authorship, but about a particular statement 
from the platform. The ordinance makes for the responsibility in writing that is pre-
sent in public utterance."). 
166 Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 352; see also id. at 352-53 ("Nor has the State explained 
why it can more easily enforce the direct bans on disseminating false documents 
against anonymous authors and distributors than against wrongdoers who might use 
false names and addresses in an attempt to avoid detection."); id. at 348-49 ("Moreo-
ver, in the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the 
recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader's 
ability to evaluate the document's message."); Tr. of Oral Argument, Mcintyre (No. 93-
986), available at 1994 WL 665265, at *38-39. 
!d. 
Well, your argument, basically I guess you make two arguments. One is that 
you will either deter fraud, or you'll make it easier to detect and prosecute 
fraud, and you will allow voters to evaluate what is said on the kind of the 
theory of, from whence it comes. What do you say about the argument that 
somebody who really wants to thwart those interests is simply not only going 
to lie once but lie twice, and put down the wrong name and address? 
167 Post, supra note 74, at 663 n .314. The impact of the Court's decision in McCon-
nell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), on Mcintyre-at least with respect 
to election-related speech-remains to be seen. 
168 Cf People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1974) ("Calculated false-
hood is never protected by the First Amendment." (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U .S. 
374, 389-90 (1967)) ); Post, supra note 74, at 663 n.314 ("The Constitution is not 
hostile to the regulation of false assertions of fact, although such regulation is mani-
festly content-based."). 
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of authorship different from the one we might otherwise demand 
were we concerned about the possibility of audience deception.169 
Thus, as the Court suggests in Mcintyre, a statement of authorship is 
an attributional device rather than a conveyer of truth; the author 
may be given as "Mrs. Mcintyre" or as "Concerned Parents and Tax 
Payers," variably, without changing the meaning of the text of the 
handbill. Thus, although the statement of pseudonymous authorship 
in this case can technically be seen as false speech-because no such 
group existed except in its pseudonymous role as author of the hand-
bills-the Court's privileging of this statement as protected speech 
under the First Amendment recognizes a value in identity creation, in 
a particularly Barthesian sense.170 What motivated Mrs. Mcintyre to 
use an authornym for her handbills was not the fear of retribution but 
a deliberate construction of identity, a desire to have the viewpoints in 
her handbill attributable to an identity other than her "true" identity. 
(Perhaps she hoped to take advantage of what she believed to be a 
reader's tendency to give greater weight to corporate authorship, even 
if unknown ("Concerned Parents and Tax Payers"), as opposed to au-
thorship by a little-known individual.) 171 So too with more literary 
169 See Kreimer, supra note 58, at 78 (discussing the school of thought that believes 
that "[a]nonymity allows a speaker to pretend to be something that she is not, and to 
convince her interlocutor under false pretenses"). 
170 To my mind, justice Holmes's oft-cited theory on the "marketplace of ideas" is 
a paradigmatic example of judicial Barthesian theory. See Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... "); 
see also Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 996. 
Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to 
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. 
They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its 
message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message. 
And then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide what is "responsi-
ble," what is valuable, and what is truth. 
/d.; Kreimer, supra note 58, at 69-70. 
[E]xposure as the author of an action or statement links that action to our 
identity; the broader the exposure, the more indissoluble the link and the 
harder it is to disavow it. Forcing citizens to publicly link themselves to iden-
tities they are constitutionally entitled to eschew is a violation of the constitu-
tionally protected autonomy-their right to define themselves. 
/d.; ACLU v. Miller, 997 F. Supp. 1228, 1230-32 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (preliminarily en-
joining enforcement of a law criminalizing the knowing transmission of data though a 
computer network "if such data uses any individual name . .. to falsely identify the 
person"). For a recent contrary view, see Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 
2004); cf. id. at 357-58 (Easterbrook,]., dubitante). 
171 On the similar Talley v. California case, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) , see Post, supra note 
74, at 640 n.213. 
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writers: History doesn't suggest that Samuel Langhorne Clemens, for 
example, chose "Mark Twain" to avoid retribution or that the authors 
of the Federalist Papers intended that readers would never discover 
their true identities. So if the author who writes under cover of pseu-
donymity is not typically concerned with preserving true anonymity, 
then the pseudonym must be doing different work from that which 
the literature typically describes. I contend here that the choice is 
motivated not from fear but from a desire to create a brand identity, 
one that does not rely on biography for meaning but relies instead on 
reader (or consumer) interpretation. 
Barthes describes the reader as the vessel for all these mean-
ings-"that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces 
by which the written text is constituted."172 The same holds true in 
trademark law, which focuses on the potentially confused consumer 
who must similarly hold together the various cultural and commercial 
meanings associated with a particular trademark; who must, for exam-
ple, be able to hold separate Continental Airlines and Continental 
Bank (without any semantic assistance from the marks themselves) 
and hold together Nike running shoes and Nike apparel. 173 Yet in 
The breadth of Talley's holding is therefore better justified by . .. the same 
principle that causes prestigious scientific journals to circulate proposed arti-
cles anonymously for peer review. The hope is that by withholding the iden-
tity of the manuscript's author, journals will obtain an impartial evaluation 
of the contents of the article, rather than a reflection of the status of its 
author. 
/d. Post's justification does not fully describe the import of these cases because 
neither Mrs. Mcintyre nor Mr. Talley circulated the writing at issue anonymously. 
Thus, rather than endeavoring to eliminate any construction of authorship, both indi-
viduals deliberately endeavored to create a new one. See ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 
979, 994 (9th Cir. 2004) . 
[I] n many instances, requiring publishers to include the names of business 
or social organizations or legal entities responsible for publishing an elec-
tion-related communication is unlikely to supply much useful information. 
As the Court noted in McConnell [ v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)], individuals 
and entities interested in funding election-related speech often join together 
in ad hoc organizations with creative but misleading names. 
/d.; Yes for Life Political Action Comm. v. Webster, 74 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 n.6 (D. Me. 
1999) ("Mcintyre would have reached the same conclusion protecting anonymity for 
Mrs. Mcintyre even if the text of the handbills had actually been composed (au-
thored) by, say, Mrs. Mcintyre's teenaged son and then distributed by her as (author-
ized) statements.") . 
172 BARTHES, supra note 16, at 148. 
173 Roland Barthes, in The Death of the Author, refers to Jean-Pierre Vemant's Mythe 
et Tragedie en Grece Ancienne (1972) in a similar vein: 
[Vemant] has demonstrated the constitutively ambiguous nature of Greek 
tragedy, its texts being woven from words with double meanings that each 
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both fields the reader cannot efficiently serve as vessel without some 
sort of system with which to organize these "traces."174 Fortunately, 
both fields supply a solution to this lacuna: In trademark law, it is the 
trademark itself that serves as the label; in literature, it is the 
authornym. 
III. AuTHORNYMS AND TRADEMARK LAw 
It is not enough simply to conclude that authornyms serve a 
trademark purpose; we must also consider the legal ramifications of 
that conclusion. If we have described a world in which the authornym 
serves two functions, that of organizing producer inputs (particular 
literary works) and that of organizing consumer inputs (goodwill), 
then we must then consider the legal mechanism through which the 
integrity of this bidirectional system can be preserved. The most use-
ful model is, not surprisingly, federal unfair competition law, which 
has in place well-developed doctrines to address misattribution of 
source. 
A. A uthornyms and Passing Off 
In the typical trademark case, the trademark holder claims that 
the defendant has used the plaintiff's trademark on goods not pro-
duced by the trademark holder-in other words, that the defendant 
has "passed off' goods made by the defendant as goods made by the 
plaintiff.175 To take a usual example, the street vendor who sells 
handbags marked CUCCI is likely engaging in the type of trademark 
infringement known as "passing off." 
character understands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is ex-
actly the "tragic") ; there is, however, someone who understands each word 
in its duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the charac-
ters speaking in front of him-this someone being precisely the reader (or 
here, the listener). 
BARTHES, supra note 16, at 148. 
174 Cf, e.g., John T . Cross, Giving Credit 'Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of 
Reverse Passing OJ! in Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REv. 709, 762 (1997) (contending 
that the name of the artist is not a useful tool when shopping for art because physical 
inspection is a better gauge of quality). This view, while somewhat Barthesian in na-
ture, ignores that the value of creative endeavor is not judged in a vacuum but is most 
usefully judged in comparison to other works by the same artist. 
175 This is true whether the plaintiff asserts claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 for a 
registered trademark or under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 for an unregistered trademark (what 
is usually called an unfair competition claim) . I use "trademark" here as a convenient 
shorthand for both. 
THE BIRTH OF THE AUTHORNYM 1433 
While passing off in the authorship context may occur relatively 
infrequently-a piece of writing branded with the name of a well-
known author who was not in fact its source176-there is no reason to 
think that when this does happen an infringement-like action should 
not be available to the author. A publisher who brands a particular 
text with the name of an author who has not authorized that branding 
has probably done so precisely to gain consumers/ readers who would 
not be attracted to the text absent the lure of the well-known author. 
Such claims can only succeed, however, if the courts are willing to 
separate out the two aspects of authorship-if, in other words, they 
can draw a distinction between the copyright aspect of authorship and 
the trademark aspect. The question of "who is the author?" arises in 
both contexts, but the answer to that question differs. In the copy-
right context, the answer tells us who is eligible to claim the bundle of 
rights afforded under copyright law: the right to copy, to distribute, to 
make derivative works, and so forth. In the trademark context, the 
answer tells us the name of the brand: the person or entity identified 
to the public as the author, regardless of whether that is the same 
answer to the copyright question. 
But the courts have not always drawn this distinction because they 
tend to think of authorship as solely a creation of copyright law. They 
are assisted in this viewpoint by the litigation strategies of many plain-
tiffs ostensibly seeking protection under trademark law whose ulti-
mate goal is to restrain publication of public domain works as 
opposed to merely obtaining attribution. In the "Mark Twain case" of 
1883,177 Samuel Clemens challenged Belford, Clark & Company's 
publication of a number of Clemens's works written as "Mark Twain" 
and in the public domain at the time of publication. In light of the 
works' public domain status, the court held that the publisher was free 
to publish the works in any form it chose, including by (accurately) 
stating the name of the author on the compilation.178 Likewise, the 
court rejected Clemens's claim that "Mark Twain" served a function 
akin to a trademark and that the unauthorized publication of the 
works under that mark served to dilute the strength of the mark: 
176 Relatively infrequently, but not never. See, e.g., George Carlin, Don't Blame Me, 
at http:/ I /www.georgecarlin.com/home/dontblame.html (last visited Feb . 12, 2005) 
(disavowing authorship of material attributed to "George Carlin" on the Internet); 
Barbara Mikkelson & David P. Mikkelson, Urban Legends Reference Pages, Kurt Von-
negut, at http:/ / www.snopes.com/ quotes/Vonnegut.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) 
(concluding that Kurt Vonnegut was not the author of a commencement speech 
widely attributed to him). 
177 Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883). 
178 Id. at 732. 
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[A] n author cannot, by the adoption of a nom de plume, be allowed 
to defeat the well-settled rules of the common law in force in this 
country, that the "publication of a literary work without copyright is 
a dedication to the public, after which any one may republish it." 
No pseudonym, however ingenious, novel, or quaint, can give an 
author any more rights than he would have under his own name. 179 
As a matter of trademark law, the court would seem to have been 
only half right: There is no reason why "Mark Twain" should not be 
considered as serving a trademarl< function, but it is difficult to con-
clude how the publication of works truthfully branded with that mark 
would cause harm to the reading public.180 If authornyms are essen-
tially trademarks, then there is no reason why these facts shouldn't 
give rise to a cause of action for infringement.181 The harder (and 
probably more frequent) case is one in which a writer's chosen 
authornym has been discarded by a subsequent writer incorporating 
his work, and for this we look to the doctrine of "reverse passing off' 
as found in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
B. Authornyms and Reverse Passing Off 
A thorough review of the case law in this area both is beyond the 
scope of this Article and has been ably accomplished by others; 18 2 
hence, only a brief overview is in order. "Reverse passing off'' is the 
179 !d. 
180 See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 639 n.9 (7th Cir. 1993). 
!d. 
The [Clemens] court did not rule out trademark protection to the author's 
use of his pen name. Rather, the court simply held that because Twain had 
not obtained a copyright in his works, his writings had been dedicated to the 
public and anyone could publish them if they properly identified the writ-
ings as Twain's. Twain's trademark infringement claim was a loser because 
he did not (and could not) allege that the defendants had falsely identified 
the origin of the published works. There was minimal risk that the public 
would be confused as to the source because the defendants clearly identified 
Mark Twain as the author; Twain simply resented that the publisher would 
profit due to his failure to obtain copyright protection. 
181 Examples of plaintiffs bringing such claims unsuccessfully (i.e., where the 
court found no likelihood of confusion) include Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures 
Corp., 186 F.2d 923, 923-24 (9th Cir. 1951) (ruling against a challenge by heirs of 
Samuel Clemens to a description of a movie based on a public domain story de-
scribed, inter alia, as "Mark Twain's Favorite Story"), and Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 
295 F. Supp. 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (ruling against a challenge to production of 
dolls described as "based on" Dr. Seuss cartoons) . 
182 See, e.g., William M. Borchard, Reverse Passing Off-Commercial Robbery or Permis-
sible Competition?, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1977); Cross, supra note 174; Lori H. Freed-
man, Reverse Passing Off: A Great Deal of Confusion, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1993); 
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term given when a seller removes the original trademark on a good or 
service and substitutes its own; as contrasted with "passing off," in 
which the seller represents that its goods are those of another, the 
"reverse passing off" seller is representing that another's goods or ser-
vices are in fact his own.1ss 
Reverse passing off is typically further divided into two types of 
claims: express passing off, in which the defendant removes the trade-
mark on another party's good and sells the good under the defen-
dant's own trademark, and implied passing off, in which the 
defendant removes the trademark on another party's good and sells 
the good without any brand at all.184 Although in the typical reverse 
passing off case, the plaintiff cannot claim lost sales because consum-
ers are not being led to the defendant's good by the use of the plain-
tiff's mark (as contrasted with a forward passing off case), the plaintiff 
usually articulates the harm suffered as a loss of goodwill-that the 
plaintiff is being deprived of the social capital its product or service 
would otherwise have engendered but for the defendant's 
misattribution. 185 
In the field of literary endeavor, this loss of goodwill constitutes 
the lion's share of the harm. While one commentator has argued that 
as to reverse passing off claims generally a defendant selling a good 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire 
Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REv. 985 (2002). 
183 See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to 
find a reverse passing off claim where subsequent work did not constitute a "bodily 
appropriation" of earlier work); Lamothe v. Atl. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 
1407-08 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a reverse passing off claim where the defendant 
attributed authorship to fewer than all joint authors of a musical composition); Smith 
v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605-07 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding the same as to a claim 
brought by an actor whose work in a film was attributed to another actor); Borchard, 
supra note 182, at 1-2; Freedman, supra note 182, at 305. One commentator has cited 
Smith v. Montoro as an "instrumental [factor] in giving life to the cause of action." 
Cross, supra note 174, at 716-17. 
184 2 McCARTHY, supra note 132, §§ 25:6, 25:8. 
185 See Borchard, supra note 182, at 18; Cross, supra note 174, at 757; Freedman, 
supra note 182, at 321 (describing the harm to the producer as the loss of a head start 
in the market). Cross argues that this argument "proves too much" because the de-
fendant, who is "engaged in competition with the plaintiff," has not "lied to or co-
erced customers," but has "merely failed to provide one item of information that 
customers might find useful." Cross, supra note 174, at 757-58. It is difficult to see, 
however, how a statement of authorship that is untrue is not a form of deception of 
the relevant reader/consumer base. For a discussion of this point in the Internet 
context, see Scoville, supra note 107 (discussing the possibility of online identity theft 
as an unfair competition cl(!.im). Note, again, that an authornym is not false because 
it is pseudonymous; it is false only if it represents an act of misbranding. 
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under its own name is making a false statement "only if consumers 
perceive it as a representation concerning the actual origin of the 
product,"186 it is almost certain that a writer falsely offering a particu-
lar piece of writing as his own is likely to be viewed as the author of 
the piece or, as this commentator continues, "the party most responsi-
ble for the ultimate quality of that product."187 
As in any trademark case, the touchstone of a reverse passing off 
claim should be whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion 
from the misattribution or failure to attribute at issue. 188 But courts 
considering section 43(a)-type claims as applied to literary works (pre-
Dastar) have tended to stray from this traditional test of consumer 
confusion, instead presuming it from the similarity of the works and 
thus inappropriately muddling trademark and copyright law.189 The 
two leading standards to determine whether a failure to credit consti-
tuted a false designation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act emerged from the Second and Ninth Circuits, and both were de-
rived from copyrigh_t law principles. The Second Circuit's standard 
turned on whether the defendant's work was "substantially similar" to 
the plaintiff's work such that failure to credit the plaintiff constituted 
a section 43(a) violation. 190 The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, took the 
view that it was not enough for the misattributed material to be "sub-
stantially similar" to the original work; rather, its requirement was that 
there must be "bodily appropriation." 191 In both cases, however, the 
touchstone was how much of the work had been copied, not the effect 
of the misattribution on the reader/consumer. One could conceive, 
for example, of an argument that wholesale appropriation of William 
186 Cross, supra note 174, at 753. 
187 !d. at 754. 
188 !d. at 722 ("That [consumer] deception cannot exist if customers, knowing all 
of the facts, would still consider defendant the origin. Therefore, a court must deter-
mine origin from the perspective of the customer, not the scientist or engineer."). 
But see, e.g., Freedman, supra note 182, at 312-13, 325-26 (contending that consumer 
confusion in the reverse passing off situation does not lead to consumer harm be-
cause the consumer is not being led to purchase the product at issue based on the use 
of the plaintiff's mark). 
189 I refer here to a "section 43(a)-type claim" because the goal of this Article is 
merely to suggest that such a claim should be available in the authornym context, as it 
is for other branding efforts, not to explore every doctrinal issue associated with such 
a claim. 
190 See, e.g., Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 783 (2d Cir. 
1994). Waldman involved two works based on stories in the public domain but, the 
court found, "[t]he similarities between the books extend beyond the underlying 
story which is in the public domain." !d. 
191 See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994) . 
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Shakespeare's Hamlet, published under another brand, would not, in 
fact, cause confusion because the work is so well known that the mis-
branding would be all but disregarded (i.e., the reader would be in on 
the joke). 
And yet the near unanimity among the lower courts prior to Das-
tar belied a critical flaw in the analysis: a failure to fully recognize that 
an action for reverse passing off (i.e., trademark infringement) in the 
creative context is wholly separate from an action for copyright in-
fringement. The author alleging that his work has been published 
under the moniker of another is not, in that claim, attempting to con-
trol the reproduction or distribution of the work qua work; he is, how-
ever, challenging the consumer (here, reader) confusion that is likely 
to result from the failure to credit him as the original author (in other 
words, the breakdown of the organizational scheme that lets readers 
associate certain works with a particular authornym).I 92 This is where 
both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit approaches inappro-
priately diverge from a traditional Lanham Act analysis. 193 While it 
may be the case that the similarity between the defendant's work and 
the plaintiff's work-whether "substantial similarity" or "bodily appro-
priation"-is a factor in determining whether the relevant readership 
is likely to be confused as to source, that conclusion cannot be 
reached without a complete analysis as would be done in any trade-
mark case. 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 194 is another exam-
ple of this doctrinal conflation. As described in the Court's opinion, 
192 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 174, at 724. 
193 In the case often seen as the genesis for misappropriation claims, International 
News Seroice v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), the Court made the same mistake, 
declining to modify a district court injunction that prohibited publication of the work 
at issue rather than, as Justice Holmes suggested in concurrence, recognizing that the 
more appropriate remedy would be "stating the truth; and a suitable acknowledge-
ment of the source is all that the plaintiff can require." !d. at 248 (Holmes,]., concur-
ring); see also Waldman Publ'g Corp., 43 F.3d at 785 (holding that the remedy for a 
reverse passing off violation is an injunction against misrepresentation of authorship, 
not a limitation on the reproduction of the work); Richard A. Posner, Misappropria-
tion: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. REv. 621, 628 (2003). 
Justice Holmes was on to something .. . [in International News Seroice be-
cause] ... [i]f AP were properly credited, newspapers would be willing to 
incur costs to remain members of AP even if they could get INS copies of the 
news in AP's dispatches for nothing, because their readers would realize they 
were getting the news from the horse's mouth, as it were, rather than at one 
remove. 
I d.; id. at 639 (suggesting that the reverse passing off claim in International News Seroice 
was "a viable theory of false advertising and one consistent with Dastar') . 
194 539 u.s. 23 (2003). 
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Twentieth Century Fox had, at one time, the exclusive rights for a 
television series based on a book by Dwight D. Eisenhower that told 
the story of the Allied campaign in Europe during World War II. The 
copyright on the television series that was eventually developed, which 
included government and pool footage, expired in 1977 when Fox 
failed to renew it, rendering the television series to the public domain. 
Dastar then purchased tapes of the television series, copied and edited 
the source material, added some minimum amount of new material, 
and sold the new package to the public as its own product, which com-
peted in the market with a re-release of the original series by a licen-
see of Fox. At issue in the case before the Supreme Court was 
whether Fox could assert a reverse passing off claim against Dastar for 
selling its repackaged series without authorial credit to the Fox 
series. 195 
The case turned on section 43(a)(l)(A) of the Lanham Act, 
which prohibits the use in commerce of any mark, "false designation 
or origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact" that is likely to cause confusion as to the "ori-
gin" of the goods or services at issue.196 Fox's claim, in essence, was 
that in marketing its videotapes without acknowledging "its nearly 
wholesale reliance on the [Fox] television series," Dastar had misled 
the buying public as to the "origin" of its goods.197 The Court con-
cluded, however, that the phrase "origin of goods" referred only to 
"the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace"-
here, the physical videotape sold by Dastar-and not "the person or 
entity that originated the ideas or communications that 'goods' em-
body or contain."198 Accordingly, Dastar had not misled the consum-
ing public because it correctly identified itself as the source of the 
videotapes it sold and, moreover, was not required to provide any 
credit to the source of the creative content those videotapes 
contained.199 
195 Id. at 25-27. Again, "passing off' occurs when a producer represents that his 
product has been made by someone else; "reverse passing off' occurs when a pro-
ducer represents that he has made someone else's product. !d. at 27 n.l. 
196 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A) (2000). 
197 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31. The Ninth Circuit, relying on its "bodily appropriation" 
theory of reverse passing off, which "subsumes the less demanding consumer confu-
sion standard," affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment on the sec-
tion 43(a) claim in favor ofF ox. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't Distrib., 
34 Fed. Appx. 312 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
198 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32. In the Court's view, Fox would have had a viable 
claim if Dastar had purchased tapes of the television series as reissued by Fox's licen-
see and repackaged those physical tapes as its own. !d. at 31. 
199 4 McCARTHY, supra note 132, § 27:77.1. 
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In rejecting Fox's Lanham Act claim, the Court took pains to out-
line the differences between copyright and patent law, which are de-
signed to encourage creativity and invention, and trademark law, 
which is designed to eliminate consumer confusion and ensure that a 
producer reaps the benefit of the seeds of goodwill he has sown. 
Once the copyright on material has expired and the material is in the 
public domain, anyone may freely and legally copy that material. This 
is the crux of the bargain inherent in the Copyright Act. In the 
Court's view, to permit an author to expand his copyright through 
trademark law would be a subversion of that bargain.200 The Court's 
interpretation of the scope of that bargain, however, included not 
only the right to copy as much or as little of material in the public 
domain as desired but also "to copy without attribution."201 A conclu-
sion, then, that Dastar misrepresented that it was the creative entity 
behind the videotapes' contents would, in the Court's view, "create a 
species of mutant copyright law" that would eliminate the very bene-
fits accrued to the public in the copyright bargain. 202 
This key holding of the Dastar case means that Lanham Act § 43 (a) ( 1) (A)'s 
prohibition on false claims of origin cannot be extended to false claims of 
the creation of inventive or communicative works. Thus "reverse passing 
off' claims brought under Lanham Act§ 43(a) (1) (A) cannot focus on alleg-
edly false claims of authorship, invention or creation. 
/d. (footnote omitted). Lower courts after Dastar have taken the Court's holding at 
face value. See, e.g., Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131 (5th Cir. 2004); Zyla 
v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243 (1st Cir. 2004); Smith v. New Line Cinema, No. 03 Civ. 
5274, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18382 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2004); Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. 
Chronicle Books, LLC, No. 03-4962, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16180 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 
2004); Bob Creeden & Assocs., Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc. , 326 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 
2004); Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121 
(D. Kan. 2004); Tao of Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. & Materials, Inc., 299 
F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2004); Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 
2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Carroll v. Kahn, No. 03-CV-0656, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17902 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003); Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 
2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Boston Int'l Music, Inc. v. Austin, No. 02-12148-GAO, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003) ; Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 
281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
200 See, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 ("The right to copy, and to copy without attribu-
tion, once a copyright has expired, like the right to make an article whose patent has 
expired-including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when pat-
ented-passes to the public." (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
201 /d. (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)); 
see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) ; Kellogg Co. v. 
Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1938). 
202 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34. Section 43(a) (1) (B) of the Lanham Act targets anyone 
who, "in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, 
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Although copyright law renders material in the public domain 
free for all to copy and use in creating new creative works, Fox's attri-
bution claim did not require Dastar to stop making use of the source 
materials at issue in the case. Rather, the question was whether, as a 
matter of trademark law, Dastar had confused the consuming public by 
providing a particular statement of authorship with respect to the ma-
terial on the videotape-the very product it was promoting to the pub-
lic.203 (To draw but one analogy, the New York Times trademark does 
or commercial activities." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (B) (2000) . The Dastarcourt poten-
tially left one door open when it suggested that a reverse passing off claim for creative 
works might be viable under section 43(a) (1) (B). Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38 (suggesting a 
cause of action might lie where "the producer of a video that substantially copied the 
[plaintiff's] series [gave,] ... in advertising or promotion[,] . . . purchasers the im-
pression that the video was quite different from that series"). But, as J. Thomas Mc-
Carthy has noted, "the 'commercial advertising or promotion' requirement is not an 
insignificant limitation on the application of § 43 (a) (1 )(B) because some courts de-
fine it in a fairly restrictive way." 4 McCARTHY, supra note 132, § 27:77.1 (citing First 
Health Group Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also 
Freedman, supra note 182, at 306 (contending that reverse passing off claims should 
be brought under what is now section 43(a) (1) (B)); Posner, supra note 193, at 639 
(suggesting that a reverse passing off claim in International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), was "a viable theory offalse advertising and one consistent 
with Dastai'). But see Kwall, supra note 182, at 1020 (contending that plaintiffs seek-
ing "a remedy for reverse passing off are disserved through their forced reliance on 
section 43(a) to redress violations that should properly be addressed within the scope 
of an independent right of attribution"). In its brief to the Supreme Court, Dastar 
had argued that the 1988 revisions to the Lanham Act eliminated the ability to bring a 
reverse passing off claim pursuant to either section 43(a) (1) (A) or section 
43(a) (1) (B). Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, Dastar (No. 02-428); see also Cross, supra 
note 174, at 736--42 (making the same contention). No other party took as broad a 
position. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 6, 29, Dastar (No. 02-428) 
(suggesting the availability of relief for reverse passing off under subparagraph (B)); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the International Trademark Association at 1, Dastar (No. 02-
428) (suggesting a claim for reverse passing off under subparagraph (A) requires a 
finding of likely consumer confusion); Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Intellec-
tual Property Law Association at 2, Dastar (No. 02-428) (same) . In any event, as Das-
tar noted in its reply brief, Fox had elected to proceed only under subparagraph (A) 
and not subparagraph (B), and so the issue of subparagraph (B)'s applicability was 
not before the Court. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.2, Dastar (No. 02-428). 
203 Cf 2 McCARTHY, supra note 132, § 10:26.1. 
In the author's view, preventing ... false claims [as to the origination of an 
idea or concept] in no way protects ideas or concepts per se [contrary to 
copyright law doctrine]. The mere use of another's idea does not trigger the 
claim. Rather, the trigger is the false representation that B originated A's 
idea. 
2 id. (discussing Attia v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1999)). It is irrele-
vant to the confusion analysis whether the work in question is under copyright or in 
the public domain, although the issue is likely to be moot in the former context be-
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not convey to its readers the source of the newsprint on which its jour-
nalistic efforts are transmitted; it conveys the source of the articles for 
which its readers presumably pay subscription fees.) 204 Dastar in-
volved a trademark dispute, not a copyright one, and so the question 
was whether Dastar was likely to cause confusion among consumers by 
appropriating authorial identity to itself rather than to the "true" au-
thor of the material on the tape (whether Fox or some other entity). 
The Dastar Court claimed, however, that determining the "au-
thor" to whom attribution was due would pose "serious practical 
problems," as complicated as a "search for the source of the Nile and 
all its tributaries."205 For example, the Court claimed: 
A video of the MGM film Carmen jones, after its copyright has ex-
pired, would presumably require attribution not just to MGM, but 
to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the film 
was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the 
musical was based), and to Prosper Merimee (who wrote the novel 
on which the opera was based) .206 
cause a copyright owner seeking to compel accurate attribution is likely simply to 
assert a copyright claim to prohibit distribution outright. See 4 id. § 27:77.1. What is 
an area of concern is the Court's "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" dilemma. See Dastar, 539 
U .S. at 36. Because an author is free to copy any portion of a public domain work he 
chooses and to make alterations to that work, that author may well become trapped 
between two attributional choices, both presumably equally unappealing to the plain-
tiff: publish the work without attribution or attribute a work to the plaintiff that has 
been altered from the original. While I don't intend to diminish the magnitude of 
this risk, it seems likely that attributional conventions (such as "based on") would 
develop to remedy this concern. See King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 829-31 
(2d Cir. 1992) (considering "based upon" credit as a viable option). 
204 Under the Court's reasoning, the viability of a Lanham Act claim depends en-
tirely on how the communicative product is packaged. A defendant who rips the 
cover off a book and substitutes a cover with his name rather than the original au-
thor's is liable; a defendant who retypes the entire book to create a new "good" is not. 
The distinction becomes even more difficult to puzzle out in the electronic environ-
ment, where the "good" that serves as the vehicle for the communicative product is 
harder to define. See, e.g., Do It Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., No. 01 C 7674, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14174 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004) (refusing to dismiss a Lanham 
Act claim, relying on Dastar, where defendant substituted its copyright notice for 
plaintiff's on a splash screen of a software program) . 
205 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35, 36; see also Lisa Samuels, Relinquish Intellectual Property, 33 
NEw LITERARY HisT. 357, 358 (2002) ("If intellectual property is transhistorical . . . 
shouldn't we credit all the writers who created the thought conditions for a writer of 
the present? How can we do that?"). 
206 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35. The Court's description of multiple claims to author-
ship is likely to occur more frequently in theatrical works than in literary ones. See, 
e.g. , Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) ; Randy Kennedy, Who 
Was that Food Stylist? Film Credits Roll On, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 2004, at AI. 
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The Court's emphasis in its example to a time "after [the work's] 
copyright has expired" seems to suggest a tenuous, yet dependent 
connection between a statement of authorship and copyright: Once 
the copyright on Carmen Jones expires, MGM no longer has the right 
to claim to be the author of the film. But while this may be true as a 
matter of copyright law-in other words, MGM would no longer have 
the ability to assert the rights granted to an author under copyright 
law-it is not at all true as a matter of trademark law, in which the 
authornym attached to a work (i.e., its "source") continues past the 
point at which the work ceases to be protected by copyright. William 
Shakespeare does not cease to be the author of Hamlet even though 
the play is in the public domain, and most readers would expect that 
singular attribution in any published edition of the work. 207 
One might argue, however, that even in a world that looks more 
like trademark than like copyright, the Court's criticism is still valid: 
How do we determine the "origin" of a work that has innumerable 
cultural influences? The authornym demonstrates that this question 
is a red herring. As has been discussed previously in this Article, 
trademark law does not concern itself with the actual source of any 
good or service (or its progenitors). It does not ask the names of the 
individual artisans who put hand to tool or the name of the advertis-
ing agency executive who devised the logo-indeed, the anonymous 
source doctrine tells us that we need never be concerned with actual 
source. Rather, trademark law concerns itself with maintaining the 
integrity of the organizational system, with ensuring that marks affirm-
atively selected by producers in the marketplace effectively segregate 
producer and consumer inputs in a way that is not likely to confuse. 
In authorship (or authomymic) terms, this means that we need not be 
concerned over whether "Amanda Cross" is really "Carolyn Heilbrun," 
or whether a particular autobiography is the work of a single individ-
ual or a gaggle of ghostwriters, or whether John Grisham the author is 
coeval with John Grisham the person.208 We take the authornym-as-
207 Jane Ginsburg makes much the same point in her recent discussion of Dastar. 
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 
Hous. L. REv. 263, 270 (2004). 
208 See jACQUELINE M.B. SEIGNETTE, CHALLENGES TO THE CREATOR DoCTRINE: Au. 
THORSHIP, COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CREATrvE WoRKS IN THE 
NETHERLANDS, GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 110-12 (1994) (stating that recogni-
tion of the right to attribution would not necessarily conflict with the copyright 
holder's exploitation interests). In trademark law, of course, the corollary to the 
"anonymous source" principle is that infringement can still take place even if the true 
identity of the manufacturer is unknown to the consumer: It is the trademark that is 
infringed, not the corporate or other identity of the underlying company. Schechter, 
supra note 140, at 815 ("A person whose name is not known, but whose mark is imi-
THE BIRTH OF THE AUTHORNYM 1443 
trademark on its face, recognizing the statement of authorship for pur-
poses of trademark law and leaving the fact of authorship to copyright 
law.209 
Thus, because reader-consumer confusion is the touchstone, the 
parodist need not fear being subject to a reverse passing off claim for 
failing to provide attribution for his source material. The successful 
parody, after all, depends on the reader's recognition of the target 
without attribution; the unsuccessful parodist, by contrast, may well be 
an infringer.210 Similarly, this would not mean, contrary to the 
tated, is just as much injured in his trade as if his name was known as well as his 
mark." (quoting Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewing Co., 13 Rep. Pat. Cas. 235, 
250 (1896))). 
209 One practical example of this distinction can be seen in the use of the Creative 
Commons license, which allows authors to cede particular rights available under copy-
right law (as opposed to an ali-or-nothing regime) . As Anupam Chander and 
Madhavi Sunder point out, almost all authors releasing works pursuant to the Crea-
tive Commons license-including the ones who have little or no copyright-based re-
strictions on distribution of their work-require attribution. Anupam Chander & 
Madhavi Sunder, The Rnmance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1361 (2004). 
210 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1997) ("In a traditional trademark infringement suit founded on the likelihood 
of confusion rationale, the claim of parody is ... merely a way of phrasing the tradi-
tional response that customers are not likely to be confused as to the source, sponsor-
ship or approval." (citing Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. 
Neb. 1986), affd, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987))); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L 
Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[A]lthough parody necessarily evokes 
the original trademark, effective parody also diminishes any risk of consumer confu-
sion."); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
A parody must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages: that 
it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody. 
To the extent that it does only the fanner but not the latter, it is not only a 
poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark law, since the customer 
will be confused. 
/d.; 5 McCARTHY, supra note 132, § 31:153 ("A non-infringing parody is merely amus-
ing, not confusing."). This is no less true when the mark the parodist seeks to invoke 
is one textually equivalent to another's personal name. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc. v. Gahary, 
196 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment where defendant's claimed impersonation of the NYSE Chairman on an 
Internet message board was a parody). Of course, interpretation in this regard will 
not always be perfect, thus rendering the line between "parody" and "misappropria-
tion" (or even "hoax") somewhat hazy. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Spoof, Hoax or Freu-
dian Slip?, WASH. PosT, Apr. 6, 1989, at B5 (describing outrage among Freud scholars 
when a purported 1900 review of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams was revealed to 
have been penned by Peter Gay, the Yale historian who claimed to have discovered it; 
Gay claimed the review was "a parody"). Moreover, the absence of likelihood of con-
fusion is not limited to parodies. See, e.g., lnt'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Work-
ers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting a Lanham 
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Court's specter in Dastar, that authors would be precluded from bor-
rowing themes, ideas, or even characters from other writers: Leonard 
Bernstein's West Side Story need not credit William Shakespeare and 
Bizet's Carmen need not credit Prosper Merimee. As with parody, the 
reader's understanding of thematic continuity is part of the conceit. 
It is therefore not likely to be confusing for readers and critics to rec-
ognize that the film Clueless echoes Jane Austen's Emma even though 
the author fails to make this statement directly.211 But where a subse-
quent author adopts the work of a previous author wholesale and 
passes it off as his own, the passing off is almost certainly not part of 
the conceit, and attribution is warranted to allow readers to appropri-
ately organize their interpretive reactions.21 2 
Act claim where recipients of anti-union literature featuring a union logo understood 
the literature to be propaganda). 
Although "plagiarism" may be a useful shorthand to describe the unsuccessful 
parodist, the roots of this Article's proposal are slightly different from those underly-
ing a ban against plagiarism. Plagiarism, like other offenses against an author's moral 
rights, is typically seen as an affront to the author-a larceny of the textual property 
that the author's skills and individualism have created and a conversion to one's own 
literary purpose. In this respect, plagiarism may be a particularly Western concept, 
given the more elevated status in other cultures for tradition and replication. See, e.g., 
Samuels, supra note 205, at 359 (describing Islamic devaluing of "original thinking"). 
And like other violations of moral rights, plagiarism does not depend on whether the 
plagiarized work is protected by copyright or in the public domain even though the 
antiplagiarism movement, like copyright, depends for its strength on the concept that 
an author's creative output has property-like characteristics that lead it to be owned 
and, subsequently, "stolen." See SAINT-AMouR, supra note 26, at 173; SAUNDERS, supra 
note 53, at 81 (describing the seventeenth-century French view of plagiarism as "lar-
ceny"); Debora Halbert, Poaching and Plagiarizing: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Fu-
tures, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGtARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERlY IN A PosTMODERN 
WoRLD, supra note 18, at 111, 111; Swearingen, supra note 18, at 21; Plagiarism-A 
Symposium, TIMES LITERARY SuPP., Apr. 9, 1982, at 413. While trademark law has a 
certain sense of the creator's protecting its goodwill-its own creative (albeit commer-
cial) effort-trademark doctrine still continues to hew to the idea that the focus of 
the regulatory efforts-and the person whose rights are truly at issue-is the confused 
consumer. Here, too, the attributional right, while perhaps having the side effect of 
protecting the author's "good name"-the trademark value in the authornym-is at 
its core intended to eliminate interpretive confusion in the reader. 
211 Cf Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be For l.ver Caught Between Marketplace 
and Authorship Norms?, in OF AuTHoRS AND ORIGINS, supra note 20, at 159, 197 (argu-
ing for a "moral right to reference" to all authors of a given work as well as to "prior 
works consciously transformed in generating the overall fabric of a new work"). 
212 In this sense, it may be the case that the more distinctive an author's work is, 
the less confusion among the reading public reverse passing off will cause. It is un-
likely, for example, that the publisher of "john Smith's Hamlet" is likely to confuse 
many readers into concluding that Shakespeare's tragedy is his own. See, e.g., Wald-
man Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 784 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a 
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CONCLUSION: AUTHORNYMI1Y, TRADEMARKS, AND MORAL RIGHTS 
The call for authorial attribution is, of course, one of the bundle 
of rights of authorship traditionally termed "moral rights"-the others 
are typically described as the "right of integrity" (which prohibits alter-
ation of the work that destroys its essential nature), the "right of dis-
closure" (which vests solely with the author the decision as to whether 
and when to publish), and the "right of withdrawal" (which permits 
the author to end the dissemination or display of a published 
work). 213 As promulgated in French and German law, the right of 
attribution comprises the right of identification (including the right 
not to be identified, or to be identified using a pseudonym) and the 
right against misattribution (which itself comprises both, in trademark 
terms, passing off and reverse passing off) 214-or, in more literary 
terms, a prohibition against piracy and a prohibition against 
plagiarism. 
This Article is not a call for moral rights.215 If the authornym and 
its corresponding attributional right are to inhere somewhere in the 
"secondary meaning" determination is inappropriate in a literary reverse passing off 
case because the plaintiff's contention is that lack of the work's secondary meaning 
will lead consumers to believe the work was created by the defendant); cf Kwall, supra 
note 182, at 1022 (positing that if the plaintiff's work "is not sufficiently well-known to 
trigger public recognition," a reverse passing off act may not cause confusion). 
213 See, e.g., Jaszi, supra note 23, at 496-97; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving 
Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A 
Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL L. REv. 151, 152-53; Neil Netanel, 
Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Conti-
nental Copyright Law, 12 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. LJ. 1, 24 (1994). 
214 See Netanel, supra note 213, at 34. 
215 U.S. copyright law recognizes moral rights only in a very limited sense through 
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (V ARA). See 17 U .S.C. § 1 06A (2000); see also 
Netanel, supra note 213, at 45-48. Despite scholarly calls for expansion of VARA's 
protections to other creative works, see, e.g., Kwall, supra note 213, at 154, no further 
recognition of moral rights appears to be on the legislative horizon. 
The difference in recognition of moral rights between the U.S. copyright system 
and the Continental copyright system inheres in the core justification for the scope of 
the author's right: In the U.S. the copyright is based on an economic desire to en-
courage both creativity and access to that creativity by the public; in France the copy-
right is based on a concept of creativity as motivated by (and related to) personality. 
See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Netanel, supra note 
213, at 7-23; Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, 10 CARDozo 
ARTs & ENT. LJ. 423, 426-27 & n.l4 (1992). Jane Ginsburg has suggested that these 
approaches are not as historically divergent as traditionally believed. See, e.g., jane C. 
Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 
in OF AuTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 20, at 130 (comparing early French and 
American copyright schemes). But see, e.g., SAuNDERS, supra note 53, at 237 (rejecting 
the denial of a "great divide" between copyright law and moral rights doctrine). 
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:4 
spectrum of U.S. intellectual property rights, the place to which to 
anchor them lies toward the trademark end of the spectrum, not the 
copyright end. The concept of moral rights is a copyright concern, 
arising out of the Romantic notion of authorship and the belief that 
creative product is an expression of the individual author. Moral 
rights therefore seek to preserve this genetic bond by prohibiting ac-
tions by subsequent authors that deny the Romantic author his promi-
nence.216 A necessary part of this doctrine-the source of the term 
"moral" in its name and, as David Saunders and Ian Hunter have de-
scribed, what distinguishes literary writing "from all those other forms 
of human labour in which the product has not been classified by the 
law as part of its producer's person"217-would therefore seem to be a 
belief that there is a singular authorial identity with which one's work 
is associated. The moral claim would weaken significantly if a single 
writer were to write under several authornyms. 
By contrast, authornymic attribution is not a matter of authorial 
justice, but rather a matter of organizational integrity. It preserves the 
organizational framework that authornyms create such that reader re-
sponses will be informed and minimizes the likelihood of confusion a 
consumer of creative commodities might otherwise experience. What 
I am describing, then, is not quite a doctrine of moral rights for au-
thors so much as it is a doctrine of moral rights for readers-a right 
that, like trademark law, takes a reader-centered view of authorship as 
opposed to copyright's writer-centered view.218 The right does not de-
mand attribution where none existed at the work's genesis-in other 
words, an author's choice to publish truly anonymously is retained,219 
216 See, e.g., SAUNDERS, supra note 53, at 195 (discussing the work of French jurist 
Bernard Edelman); Edward]. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for 
the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1988);Jaszi, supra note 
23, at 496, 500; Kwall, supra note 182, at 985-86; see also Lemley, supra note 52, at 894 
(suggesting that the "extremely limited success of moral rights theories in the United 
States" is evidence of the failure of Romantic authorship) . 
217 Saunders & Hunter, supra note 23, at 499. 
218 Many commentators who call for explicit recognition of the right of attribution 
in U.S. law proffer the protection of the creative spirit as a justification: See, e.g., 
Kwall, supra note 182, at 1020-21. My proposal, focused on the needs of the reader in 
an interpretive and economic guise rather than on the author's desire for acknowl-
edgment, is detached from any such considerations. 
219 See, e.g., Damich, supra note 216, at 54 (suggesting that an author who wished 
to remain anonymous but whose work, although published with his consent, con-
tained an unwanted (yet accurate) attribution, "would have causes of action for public 
disclosure of private facts and appropriation of his name"); Kreimer, supra note 58, at 
69-70 ("Forcing citizens to publicly link themselves to identities they are constitution-
ally entitled to eschew is a violation of their constitutionally protected autonomy-
their right to define themselves."); cf. Cross, supra note 174, at 726 (noting that a 
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just as no producer is forced to brand its goods. Nor is it terribly 
concerned with identifying the "true" author of a piece so much as it 
is ensuring that the original attribution survives republication. This is 
contrary to the Continental view of the right of attribution, which, for 
example, denies any paternity right to the individual under whose 
name a ghostwritten book is published and awards the right instead to 
the writer who put pen to paper, regardless of any ordering of these 
rights provided by contract.220 
From a literary theorist's perspective, then, the authornym as 
trademark mediates between copyright law's Romantic vision of au-
thorship and the poststructuralist's authorless texts. Like the values 
transmitted by copyright, attribution links a text to an author without 
prohibiting use of that text once it enters the public domain. And like 
the poststructuralist's reader's exercise, attribution serves only to pre-
serve an interpretive organizing framework without infusing that exer-
cise with biographical or other Romantic details.22I 
reverse passing off claim is not actionable unless the plaintiff can show that absent the 
defendant's misattribution, credit would have come to plaintiff instead, thus barring 
such claims for anonymous works). 
220 CJ, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[B]e-
cause the employer is considered the author of the work, once authorship rights are 
relinquished through a work for hire contract provision, the right to attribution is 
also relinquished unless that right is reserved explicitly in the contract."); Vargas v. 
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 525-26 (noting that the plaintiff divested himself of any 
claim to attribution in the work by conferring all rights in the work via contract); 
Jones v. Am. Law Book Co., 109 N.Y.S. 706 (App. Div. 1908) (same); Roddy-Eden v. 
Berle, 108 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (holding a ghostwriting agreement void and 
unenforceable as against public policy); see also Netanel, supra note 213, at 50. 
Netanel further notes that although, in a moral rights regime, a ghostwriter may not 
assign his attributional right to the stated author by contract, he may, in Germany but 
not in France, explicitly agree to waive his right to attribution. Id. at 52-53 & n.273. 
221 Susan Lanser describes the mediating effect of attribution as creating a circu-
larity between "the projects of authorial identification and textual interpretation": 
Although Rnxana was originally an anonymous work called The Fortunate Mis-
tress, I approach it today as a metonym of Daniel Defoe, who is already 
known to me as a set of texts .... At the same time that I create Rnxana 
through Defoe, I (re)create Defoe through Rnxana. When I then encounter 
a possible new 'Defoe'-say, a piece of unattributed journalism-my deci-
sion to accept or reject this work as Defoe's is likely, barring external evi-
dence, to be predicated on my existing construction of the author; if the text 
fits, it gets added to the canon that, in turn, (re )constitutes Defoe. If I deter-
mine that Defoe could not have written the piece because he was a Whig or a 
Dissenter, the work is cast back to the oblivion of anonymity-and deprived 
of considerable cultural capital. 
Lanser, supra note 65, at 82. 
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The authornym's place in the realm of trademark does not neces-
sarily mean that it must lie in tension with copyright law. Opponents 
of such a right may argue that to require continued attribution past 
the time when copyright protection expires would be but an albatross 
around the collective neck of the creative commons, thwarting the 
effort to mine the public domain for works of new authorship.222 But 
the authornym actually embraces the concept of the intergenerational 
relationship among authors by giving full voice and credence to the 
fact of borrowing even where (perhaps only where) such borrowing is 
legally permissible.223 It does not detract from the volume of material 
in the public domain but rather requires that the material not be 
divested from the organizational structure in which it was originally 
created, and then only in cases in which such divestment is likely to 
thwart the interpretive effort.224 
In this respect, this Article is but an additional step on what seems 
to be an increasingly trodden path away from the Romantic author-
genius construct and toward a more complete conception of author-
ship. For if we are all authors in our fashion, we are undoubtedly 
readers first, and we cannot hope to be efficient literary consumers 
(in both senses of the word) without some confidence that the works 
222 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, in THE 
CoNsTRUCTION OF AuTHORSHIP, supra note 15, at 159. 
223 A less flattering take on this response is to portray it as denying the concept of 
originality full stop-in other words, conceding that there is indeed "nothing new 
under the [literary] sun" and that all creative work, even that protected under copy-
right law, is essentially indebted to what has come before. See, e.g., SAINT-AMouR, 
supra note 26, at 37 ("The broad project of the defenses of plagiarism was to overhaul 
the Romantic mythology of original genius, remaking genius as a function of assimila-
tion and recombination rather than a fountainhead of fresh invention."); see also 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Quotation and Originality, in LETTERS AND SOCIAL AIMS 175, 
191 (1904). 
If an author give us just distinctions, inspiring lessons, or imaginative poetry, 
it is not so important to us whose they are .... We may like well to know what 
is Plato's and what is Montesquieu's or Goethe's part, and what thought was 
always dear to the writer himself; but the worth of the sentences consists in 
their radiancy and equal aptitude to all intelligence. 
/d. It is not my intent in this Article to present an apologia for plagiarism; quite the 
contrary, in fact. 
224 See, e.g., Raven, supra note 65, at 144 (describing the use of pseudonymous "By 
the author of ... "as an aid to linking works unattributable to a specific individual). 
An attribution right therefore differs significantly in this respect from proposals for 
an extended copyright term, which would deplete the public domain by restricting 
works from being used at all without permission, see, e.g., SAINT-AMouR, supra note 26, 
at 124, or from a complete extension of moral rights, which amounts to what David 
Saunders, using a phrase of Robert Gorman's, has termed an "aesthetic veto," see 
SAUNDERS, supra note 53, at 208. 
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that we read-and later draw on for our own creative activity-are 
situated within a coherent literary structure. The authornym-and, 
more particularly, the authornym-as-trademark-seems perlectly 
suited to the task: It maintains the integrity of author and reader in-
puts, but it rarely purports to represent itself as the gateway to any 
genetic meaning. That work is left to the reader I consumer of the 
text. It is only when we recognize this Barthesian/Foucauldian lack of 
meaning, the essential pseudonymity of all statements of authorship, 
that we can begin to move to this reader-focused version of authorship 
and create room for the values that trademark law can efficiently pro-
mote in the marketplace of ideas. 
